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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
This dissertation offers an understanding and theorization of the attraction of radical 
Islamism in the West through theoretical perspectives that combine different levels of 
explanation of radicalization. The dissertation consists of five research articles, which 
are synthesized in these summary chapters. 
Article 1 (“Jihadism from a Subcultural Perspective”) discusses the relevance of a 
subcultural approach to the study of jihadism. It argues that part of the attraction of 
jihadism can be understood by viewing jihadism as a subculture that provides an 
answer to problems pertaining to participants’ shared social position. Furthermore, 
the article argues that a subcultural approach to jihadism enables an analysis of one of 
the hybrid forms of cultural expression central to jihadi subculture, namely jihadi rap 
music. The article suggests that jihadi rap is a way to express resistance through a 
creative cultural bricolage of different and often contradictory cultural styles, and that 
jihadi rap can be interpreted as the explicit manifestation of a broader collective, 
oppositional, and subcultural answer to a shared situation of experienced othering.  
Article 2 (“Rap, Islam, jihadi cool: A contribution to understanding the subcultural 
attractions of Western jihadi subculture”) seeks to explain (part of) what makes jihadi 
subculture attractive by analyzing the historical relationship between hip-hop and 
Islam. The article traces the employment of Islam in hip-hop to recent developments 
of jihadi rap. Within jihadi rap, we observe a form of bricolage that mixes and 
combines hip-hop musical style, the symbolism of US Black Islam, and jihadism, and 
the article argues that this type of stylistic appropriation of hip-hop coolness is part of 
what makes jihadi rap – and, in a broader sense, jihadi subculture – aesthetically and 
stylistic cool and therefore attractive. 
Article 3 (“Reinstating and contextualizing religion in the analysis of Islamist 
radicalization in the West”) seeks to reinstate religion in the analysis of Islamist 
radicalization. It argues that radicalization research is characterized by an analytical 
deadlock between opposing positions explaining Islamist radicalization primarily 
through structural factors versus primarily through specific interpretations of Islam. 
The article introduces and develops an analytical perspective that enables a synthesis 
between these opposing positions as it offers a way to understand how social and 
political contexts can be connected to religiosity. It provides an understanding of how 
emotions, such as anger towards society, can be transformed into strong religious 
emotions in radical Islamist groups, which in some cases can initiate and amplify 
religiously-based motivations to endorse or commit violence, and how radical 
Islamism offers an order of emotions that can be experienced as a form of 
empowerment and therefore attractive. 
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Article 4 (“The Role of Religion in Islamist Radicalisation Processes”) analyzes 
interviews with five former radical Islamists and explores why they became religious 
and what characterized the processes of radicalization in the radical Islamist groups 
they became part of. The article finds that religion provided them with answers to 
emotions connected to doubt about existential questions, lack of a sense of belonging, 
experiences of troublesome family backgrounds, and discrimination. What attracted 
the “formers” to the radical Islamist groups and worldviews was that these gave them 
a new understanding of themselves and society and a sense of empowerment. The 
hatred, anger, and frustration that dominated the ideas, thoughts, and actions of the 
radical Islamist groups amplified and initiated the formers’ radicalization. 
Article 5 (“Talking about Radicalization”) reflects on the inherent methodological 
problems of doing qualitative research on radicalization – a hard-to-reach group and 
a sensitive topic. The article shows how talking about radicalization with 
“professionals” working within prevention and other actors closely related to the issue 
of radicalization from a non-Muslim, white ethnic Danish researcher positionality 
often involved discussions about the concept of radicalization itself, sometimes at the 
expense of obtaining data on actual radicalization processes. 
These summary chapters offer not only a more thorough theoretical and 
methodological understanding of the approaches taken in the research articles but also 
an elaboration of how radicalization processes understood as processes of subcultural 
formation and processes of development of religious emotions can be combined in an 
analytically fruitful manner that aids the understanding and theorization of the pull 
factors, or attraction, of radical Islamism in the West. 
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DANSK RESUME 
Gennem teoretiske perspektiver, der kombinerer forskellige niveauer af forklaring på 
radikalisering, tilvejebringer denne afhandling en forståelse og teoretisering af, hvad 
der er tiltrækkende ved radikal islamisme i Vesten. Afhandlingen består af fem 
forskningsartikler, som bliver syntetiseret i disse sammenfattende kapitler. 
Artikel 1 (Jihadism from a Subcultural Perspective) diskuterer relevansen af en 
subkulturel tilgang til studiet af jihadisme. Artiklen argumenterer for, at en del af det 
tiltrækkende ved jihadisme kan forstås ved at se jihadisme som en subkultur, der 
tilbyder et svar på problemer, der bunder i deltagernes delte sociale position. Artiklen 
argumenterer desuden for at relevansen af en subkulturel tilgang til jihadisme kan 
findes i dens evne til at analysere en af de centrale hybride kulturelle udtryksformer i 
jihadi subkultur, nemlig jihadi rap musik. Artiklen argumenterer for, at jihadi rap er 
en måde at udtrykke modstand gennem en kreativ kulturel bricolage af forskellige og 
ofte modstridende kulturelle stile, og at jihadi rap kan fortolkes som den eksplicitte 
manifestation af et bredere kollektivt, oppositionelt og subkulturelt svar på en delt 
situation bestående af oplevet andengørelse. 
Artikel 2 (Rap, Islam, jihadi cool: A contribution to understanding the subcultural 
attractions of Western jihadi subculture) søger at forklare (en del af) det tiltrækkende 
ved jihadi subkultur ved at analysere det historiske forhold mellem hiphop og islam. 
Artiklen sporer anvendelsen af islam i hiphop til nylige udviklinger af jihadi rap. Inden 
for jihadi rap kan man observere en form for bricolage, der mixer og kombinerer 
hiphop musikalsk stil, US Black Islam symbolisme og jihadisme, og artiklen 
argumenterer for, at denne type af stilistisk appropriation af hiphop coolness er en del 
af, hvad der gør jihadi rap – og i en bredere forstand jihadi subkultur – æstetisk og 
stilistisk cool og derfor tiltrækkende. 
Artikel 3 (Reinstating and contextualizing religion in the analysis of Islamist 
radicalization in the West) søger at genindsætte religion i analysen af islamistisk 
radikalisering. Artiklen argumenterer for, at radikaliseringsforskningen er 
karakteriseret af et analytisk dødvande mellem modstridende positioner, der forklarer 
islamistisk radikalisering enten gennem primært strukturelle faktorer eller gennem 
primært specifikke fortolkninger af islam. Artiklen introducerer og udvikler et 
analytisk perspektiv, der muliggør en syntese mellem disse modstridende positioner, 
eftersom det tilbyder en måde at forstå, hvordan sociale og politiske kontekster kan 
være knyttet til religiøsitet. Perspektivet tilvejebringer en forståelse af, hvordan 
følelser som vrede mod samfundet kan transformeres til stærke religiøse følelser i 
radikale islamistiske grupper, som i nogle tilfælde kan igangsætte og forstærke 
religiøst baserede motivationer til at støtte eller udøve vold. 
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Artikel 4 (The Role of Religion in Islamist Radicalisation Processes) analyserer 
interviews med fem tidligere radikale islamister og undersøger, hvorfor de blev 
religiøse, og hvad der karakteriserede radikaliseringsprocessen i de radikale 
islamistiske grupper, de blev en del af. Artiklen konkluderer at religion tilbød dem 
svar på følelser forbundet til tvivl om eksistentielle spørgsmål, manglende følelse af 
tilhørsforhold, oplevelser fra problemfyldte familieforhold og diskrimination. Det, der 
tiltrak de tidligere radikale islamister til radikale grupper og deres verdenssyn var, at 
det gav dem en ny forståelse af sig selv og samfundet og en følelse af empowerment. 
Hadet, vreden og frustrationerne, der dominerede ideerne, tankerne og handlingerne i 
de radikale grupper, forstærkede og igangsatte de tidligere radikale islamisters 
radikalisering. 
Artikel 5 (Talking about Radicalization) reflekterer over de iboende metodologiske 
problemer ved at foretage kvalitativ forskning om radikalisering – en svært 
tilgængelig gruppe og et sensitivt emne. Artiklen viser, hvordan det at tale med 
’professionelle’ som arbejder med forebyggelse af radikalisering og andre aktører tæt 
forbundet til radikalisering fra en ikke-muslimsk, hvid etnisk dansk forsker 
positionalitet ofte involverede diskussioner om radikaliseringsbegrebet, sommetider 
på bekostning af data om faktiske radikaliseringsprocesser. 
Disse sammenfattende kapitler tilbyder en grundigere teoretisk og metodologisk 
forståelse af de tilgange, der anvendes i forskningsartiklerne, men også en elaborering 
af, hvordan radikaliseringsprocesser forstået som subkulturelle processer og 
processer, der fører til udvikling af religiøse følelser, kan kombineres på en analytisk 
frugtbar måde, der underbygger forståelsen og teoretiseringen af pull-faktorer, eller 
det tiltrækkende, forbundet med radikal islamisme i Vesten.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. PLACING THE PHD DISSERTATION WITHIN THE BROADER 
PROJECT 
This PhD dissertation is part of a larger project on Islamist radicalization processes 
lead by Associate Professor Sune Qvotrup Jensen and funded by Aalborg University’s 
Talent Management Programme. The larger project sought to understand Islamist 
radicalization processes through the theoretical perspectives of subculture, gender and 
masculinity, and the sociology of religion. The following will describe how the 
different parts of the project have been distributed, and what the independent 
contribution of the PhD dissertation has been. 
Gathering the empirical material 
The empirical material, which this dissertation and the larger project draw on, has 
been collected by me, the author (see chapter four of these summary chapters). 
• The empirical material, A 
I have been responsible for identifying and contacting potential interviewees and for 
the continued contact with interviewees who have functioned as “attempted 
gatekeepers” who could refer me to other potential interviewees. I have also been 
responsible for conducting the interviews in person across Denmark and via video 
calls.  
• The empirical material, B 
Another empirical pillar, which I also have been responsible for, is virtual 
ethnographic-inspired internet research on jihadi rap. This material has been used in 
Articles 1 and 2, which analyze jihadi subculture. 
• The empirical material, C 
Another type of empirical material, which I have been responsible for finding, is 
biographical and journalistic sources. These have been used in some of the analyses 
but mostly as background material in the articles associated with this dissertation and 
the larger project. 
Theoretical division of labor 
• A) Subculture and gender/masculinity 
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Jensen has been the lead writer on theoretical discussions of subcultural and 
masculinity perspectives in the articles where these perspectives are applied (Articles 
1 and 2). Within these articles, my contribution has been the analysis of the empirical 
examples. I have thus through subcultural and gender perspectives illustrated how 
jihadi subcultural styles, symbols, texts, and song lyrics can further our understanding 
of the attraction of radical Islamism in the West. These summary chapters, however, 
also include my independent discussion of the relevance of a subcultural approach to 
radicalization. 
• B) Sociology of religion 
The religious dimension of the larger project can be defined as my “subproject” within 
the larger project. I have been responsible for studying how religion has been 
discussed in the field of radicalization research and what role religion has been given 
in the understanding of radicalization. I have discussed and synthesized the different 
perspectives on the role of religion in Articles 3 and 4, which I independently  
authored. This also includes the introduction of a new sociological perspective that 
previously has been unutilized in the field of radicalization research. This perspective 
is the sociology of religious emotion (Riis & Woodhead 2010). I am therefore 
responsible for the theoretical contribution of sociology of religion and the discussion 
and analysis of how such a perspective can be useful in the understanding of Islamist 
radicalization processes. In these summary chapters, I furthermore discuss how the 
theoretical perspectives from subcultural theory and the sociology of religion are 
connected on an analytical level and complement each other, and how they contribute 
to the theorization of the attraction of radical Islamism. 
Methodological reflections 
I have been responsible for developing a reflective analysis of the methodological 
experiences of doing qualitative research on the political and highly contested concept 
of radicalization as a white, non-Muslim academic (Article 5). Chapter 4 of these 
summary chapters furthermore includes my reflections on interviewing former radical 
Islamists, doing virtual ethnographic-inspired internet research, and utilizing 
alternative empirical sources such as biographical material and journalistic sources. 
The division of labor has led to an independent dissertation that is grounded in 
subcultural theory and the sociology of religion. Through these perspectives and the 
empirical material, the dissertation seeks to further the understanding of and theorize 
what attracts people from the West who identify as Muslims to radical Islamist 
worldviews. 
The next sections will describe the dissertation’s contribution to the research field of 
Islamist radicalization, present the overall research aim and question, and show how 
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the different questions and perspectives of the research articles are related to each 
other. 
1.2. PLACING THE DISSERTATION IN THE RESEARCH FIELD – 
A FOCUS ON “ATTRACTION” 
The term “radicalization” has taken center stage in both academia and policy-making. 
However, there is no universally accepted definition of the concept. Alex P. Schmid 
(2013) has called the concept of radicalization “fuzzy” and “problematic” since it has 
been applied and understood in many different ways. However, it seems that we are 
“stuck” with radicalization (Horgan 2011). It has become an “analytical paradigm” 
(Malthaner 2017) and a “master signifier” (Kundnani 2012). The concept of 
radicalization has its origin in policy-making. After the attacks in Madrid in 2004 and 
London in 2005, the approach to and understanding of terrorism shifted from viewing 
terrorists as an external threat embedded in an “evil ideology” rooted in Islam 
(Johnson 2002) that should be fought through war, to viewing terrorism as something 
that could and should be analyzed; the homegrown terrorists of the Madrid and 
London attacks necessitated an exploration of how a terrorist could be produced in 
democratic Western societies (Kundnani 2012; Coolsaet 2019). “Radicalization” 
became the preferred conceptualization of this process. With its implementation in 
policy-making, radicalization was brought into the academic discussion (Schmid 
2013; Kundnani 2012; Silva 2018). Some positions within this discussion have, 
however, been highly critical of the way the concept of radicalization has been applied 
in both policy-making and academic research. The following sections will discuss 
some of this criticism and what the answers to this criticism have been in 
radicalization research, and in the end, argue why a focus on the “attraction” of radical 
Islamism, given specific social and societal circumstances, can provide a fruitful 
analytical perspective and a way forward. 
A critique of methodological individualism in radicalization research 
A main critique within the academic discussion has been that radicalization has been 
understood mainly as a microlevel process, and as a consequence, the political and 
social contexts have been disregarded. Proponents of this critique argue that the 
concept of radicalization came to academic research with pre-inscribed assumptions. 
As discussed in Article 5, Pierre Bourdieu argues that social scientists need to break 
free from prefabricated problem formulations stemming from official and political 
definitions of the phenomenon under investigation, as these are products and 
reflections of doxical perceptions of the world (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992/1996). In 
regard to the concept of radicalization, one of these pre-inscribed assumptions is that 
Islamic theology inspires terrorists’ attacks and, thus, that individual psychological 
and theological factors predict who become terrorists (Kundnani 2012: 5). The 
critique has been that the concept of radicalization has rendered the entire Muslim 
community in the West to be suspected of radicalization and, in the end, of terrorism 
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(see, e.g., Kundnani 2012; Malthaner 2017; Crone 2016; Githens-Mazer & Lambert 
2010). According to the critics, this stigmatization and its resultant ethnic profiling 
can be counterproductive and actually make some people more prone to radicalization 
(see, e.g., Cassam 2018: 189; Silva 2018: 47; Schmid 2013: 5; Sedgwick 2010: 491). 
By understanding radicalization as an individual psychological and theological 
process, governments and policy-makers, according to this viewpoint, exclude 
potentially politically awkward factors from the analysis of radicalization (see, e.g., 
Schmid 2013: 5; Kundnani 2012: 5; Cassam 2018; Silva 2018). One critique within 
the academic discussion has thus been that the process of radicalization has been 
understood as being driven by individual push factors or deficits. 
I agree with this critique. This dissertation therefore attempts to break with the 
criticized methodological individualism of both the concept of radicalization and of 
the usage of this concept in theoretical conceptions of radicalization processes. This 
is done by insisting on an approach that has the interplay between micro and macro 
factors in the center of the analysis (see Jensen & Larsen 2019). The answer to the 
critique of individualism in this dissertation is then not an analysis solely relying on 
structural explanations of radicalization. Some researchers have, however, relied 
mainly on structural factors, such as economic and social marginalization, in their 
explanation of radicalization processes. In other words, they have focused on 
structural push factors. The following section will discuss why such a focus can be 
problematic. 
A critique of structural marginalization explanations in radicalization research 
An ongoing debate among researchers has been whether or not there is a link between 
terrorism and socioeconomic factors. Some have argued that jihadists mostly come 
from middle-class families and are well educated (see Sageman 2008). Others argued 
that most militant jihadists come from lower socioeconomic strata (see Bakker 2011; 
Hecker 2018; for an overview, see Borum 2011). Peter R. Neumann (2016: 89-90) 
observed that socioeconomic origin is dependent on which country the militants are 
from. According to Neumann, foreign fighters from Germany, Belgium, France, and 
Scandinavia mostly come from the lower socioeconomic strata of their society, and 
they only have a low-level education, while foreign fighters from the UK mostly have 
completed a higher education. Thomas Hegghammer (2016) similarly noted that we 
cannot assume that the dynamics of terrorism is the same all over the world. His point 
is that there is a link between poverty and terrorism in the European context (see also 
Cottee 2011: 738). The point is not that there necessarily is a causal link between 
economic deprivation and terrorism, but rather that economic deprivation predisposes 
for radicalization (Hegghammer 2016: 13). 
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Some scholars therefore argue that we should look towards structural factors when 
explaining root causes for Islamist radicalization.1 Structural factors are, however, 
more than economy/poverty itself. Instead, they have often been understood as the 
collective outcomes of economic deprivation, lack of mobility, experiences with 
racism and othering, and so on – what, in short, might be called an ethno-class 
experience (see Article 3). Many scholars who point to structural factors, and not 
individual psychology, as root causes of radicalization often maintain that structural 
factors are mediated through identity and status frustration (see Neumann 2016: 90; 
Cottee 2011: 738). The point is often made that jihadism can function as an answer to 
these frustrations (Roy 2017; Cottee 2011; Hafez & Mullins 2015; Neumann 2016; 
Khosrokhavar 2017). The Salafist movement offers a way to rebel against Western 
society as it is as different as possible from the way of life in the West. Salafism also 
offers order as there are rules for most aspects of life, and it offers friendship and a 
social network (Neumann 2016: 112; Roy 2017; see also Article 3). Jihadism is thus 
understood as “an act of identity recovery” that is especially attractive for young 
people in the “ghetto” who on the one hand hate the society they live in and, on the 
other, feel that their situation is hopeless (Khosrokhavar 2017: 74-75; Roy 2017). 
Structural explanations for radicalization place radicalization in the context of social 
and societal circumstances, which to some extent answers the criticism of the 
methodological individualism in radicalization research. Social conditions are taken 
seriously. However, even though structural explanations are necessary in order to 
understand who can find radical Islamism attractive, they are inadequate explanations. 
Many people experience structural strain, but they react to it in different ways. It is 
only a small minority that consider radical Islamism or jihadism as an answer. By 
focusing on the collective outcome of economic deprivation, lack of mobility, 
experiences with racism and othering, and so on, as the main driver of radicalization, 
structural perspectives end up arguing that radicalization is driven by structural push 
factors. It becomes an argument based on misery (or strain) pushing people into 
radical Islamism. Even though structural explanations are important in understanding 
who might be attracted to radical Islamist worldviews, they are less productive in 
explaining what might be attractive in these worldviews. Structural explanations leave 
little room for the (religious and political) meaning that radical Islamists themselves 
ascribe to their thoughts and actions. The argument seems to be that, even though 
radicals say that they travel to, for example, Syria for religious reasons, what in reality 
made them go were structural factors such as economic and social deprivation. This 
is problematic because religion is thus treated as an epi-phenomenon, and the role of 
religion is downplayed. As a result, by focusing on structural push-factors, this 
perspective does not say much about what people identifying as Muslims might find 
attractive about radical Islamism in its own (religious and political) right. Recognizing 
that structural factors are important, this dissertation seeks to provide an 
understanding of how structural social conditions can be related to individual 
                                                          
1 The following section resembles arguments made in Article 3. 
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emotions, how these emotions can be constructed as religious emotions in a radical 
interpretation of Islam, and, through the empirical material, theorize what can be 
attractive in such a religious worldview (see Articles 3 and 4). The focus is thus on 
the interplay between structural and individual levels of explanation. Furthermore, by 
focusing on misery pushing people into radical Islamism, structural explanations are 
also inclined to overlook the more subcultural attraction of radical Islamism based on 
style and aesthetics. There is a need for more attention to what jihadi subcultures 
provide that is attractive. Some researchers on Islamist radicalization have described, 
for example, the attractiveness of jihadi coolness (Sageman, 2008), and some have 
taken a subcultural perspective on the phenomenon (Cottee 2011; Hemmingsen 2015; 
Pisoiu 2015b; Conti 2017; Andersen & Sandberg 2018; also see chapter 3 for an 
elaborate discussion of subcultural perspectives in radicalization research), but this 
dissertation argues that a subcultural perspective can contribute to more than what has 
hitherto been accomplished in terms of style and aesthetics, and add to the analytical 
focus on and theorization of the attraction of radical Islamism.  
As a response to the focus on individual and structural push-factors, some scholars 
have suggested that we need to focus on what might pull some people towards radical 
Islamism. A focus on pull factors can therefore be seen as a stepping-stone towards 
this dissertation’s focus on attraction. 
Political pull factors  
Some scholars have insisted that the roads leading to terrorism are first and foremost 
political processes, as extremist versions of religions always articulate a political 
ideology and because the main drivers of radicalization should be found in reactions 
to geopolitical circumstances, such as Western intervention in Muslim countries and 
Islamophobia in Western countries (Crone 2016; see also Schmid 2013: 9; Kundnani 
2012: 20).2 The reference to jihadists’ idea of building a new Islamic state is often 
used as an argument to understand jihadists as political actors and to focus on pull 
factors. The argument is often made that jihadists are driven by political aspirations 
to change Western societies and create new societies and states elsewhere and should 
therefore be seen as rational political actors (Boserup 2016: 16; J. Sheikh 2016; 
Hemmingsen 2014). Manni Crone (2016: 596) thus argued that the prospect of a 
political utopia is one of the attractions of the Islamic State (ISIS). Therefore, what 
we need to understand is, according to Crone (2016: 587-588), that Islamist 
radicalization is not an individual process driven by religious ideology but instead by 
a “process of politicization.” 
By focusing on political pull factors and what might attract some people to radical 
Islamism, radicalization as a political process can be understood as a stepping-stone 
towards this dissertation’s aim of understanding and theorizing the attraction of 
                                                          
2 The following section resembles arguments made in Article 3. 
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radical Islamism. However, by emphasizing the political aspects of radicalization and 
terming it a process of politicization, the perspective neglects other areas of 
attraction, which radical Islamism has to offer. Just as structural marginalization 
explanations, political explanations also risk downplaying religious aspects and 
attractions of radicalization, for example, that the state-building project is specifically 
about building an Islamic state (see Article 3), and they risk overlooking attractions 
pertaining to style and aesthetics. 
The focus on attraction - a third space in radicalization research 
Instead of understanding Islamist radicalization as driven by individual or structural 
push factors, this dissertation offers a third space in radicalization research. It focusses 
on pull factors or, in other words, what attracts people who identify as Muslims to 
radical Islamism. Importantly, however, these pull factors can only be understood 
when we take into account both the microlevel and the macrolevel. The aim is 
therefore to understand and theorize the attraction of radical Islamism given specific 
social and societal circumstances. It is, however, still important to look at individual 
psychological or emotional factors, but in order to understand the formation of these 
individual emotions, we have to take into account the social and societal 
circumstances. Likewise, structural factors are still important in the understanding of 
the main drivers of radicalization, but these structural factors must be understood in 
connection to individual experiences in order to understand what can attract social 
actors and groups to radical Islamism. The aim of the articles that constitute this 
dissertation and these summary chapters is to further discuss and illuminate the 
interplay between micro-, meso-, and macrolevel explanations of radicalization in 
order to understand and theorize what attracts young people from the West to radical 
Islamism.  
This is done through the analyses of processes of subcultural formation and processes 
of development of religious emotions. The subcultural perspective includes, but is not 
limited to, structural explanations of Islamist radicalization as it understands the 
attractiveness of subcultures as the answer they provide to shared situations of 
individuals (Jensen 2018a; Williams 2011. See chapter 3 of the summary chapters). 
However, the perspective adds the aesthetic and stylistic attraction of radical Islamism 
(see Articles 1 and 2). The focus on the development of religious emotions is 
important, not least because radical Islamists themselves most often give religious 
motivations for their thoughts and actions (see, e.g., Dawson & Amarasingam 2017). 
We consequently need to understand how religious emotions are constructed, and in 
order to do so, we need to take into account the social and societal situation of the 
individual. The perspectives thus accentuate the necessity of understanding the 
interplay among micro-, meso- and macrolevel explanations. This provides a way to 
understand and theorize radical Islamism as an attractive religious answer to the social 
and societal position of Muslims in the West (see Articles 3 and 4). 
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1.3. WHAT COUNTS AS RADICAL? A DEFINITION 
Before presenting the overall research question and the research aims of the articles, 
this section will present the dissertation’s definition of “radicalization.” A strand of 
critique has asserted that the concept of radicalization is a source of confusion because 
it is employed in different contexts with different agendas (see Sedgwick 2010; 
Schmid 2013). One agenda is the security agenda (Sedgwick 2010), or the Anglo-
Saxon approach (Neumann 2013), where the line between radical and moderate 
concerns whether there is a security threat to the state or individual persons. Another 
is the integration agenda (Sedgwick 2010), or the European approach (Neumann 
2013), where radicalization is not just a security concern but also about ideological 
worldviews that do not comply with basic democratic values. These different agendas 
and approaches are at the forefront of the central debate within academic research 
about differentiating between cognitive and behavioral radicalization (for an overview 
see Neumann 2013; Malthaner 2017). 
This dissertation lies closer to the integration agenda/European approach and agrees 
with scholars who insist that we, in order to understand why radicals act and think as 
they do, have to look at their belief system, but also at the secondary gains of 
radicalization (besides the manifest goal of changing society). These gains could be 
in terms of a sense of community, friendship, identity, and status (see Lindekilde & 
Olesen 2015: 143-144). Group-level mechanisms such as these are necessary to 
understand Islamist radicalization processes, and it would therefore be 
counterproductive to only focus on those that have committed a crime and isolate them 
from their milieu. This dissertation thus, importantly, understands Islamist 
radicalization processes as not only pertaining to perpetrators of violent extremism 
but also to a broader milieu that supports anti-democratic worldviews based on what 
is perceived by the individuals to be Islam. Accordingly, this dissertation defines 
Islamist radicalization as processes that in democracies lead to anti-democratic 
values and/or the acceptance of violence as a legitimate means based on a frame of 
reference individuals or groups themselves define as Islamic. 
Within this dissertation, radicalization processes are analytically understood and 
discussed in a specific light that consists of processes of subcultural formation and 
development of religious emotions.  
1.4. RESEARCH AIM AND QUESTIONS 
In view of the above, the research aim and questions of this dissertation all seek to 
move beyond methodological individualism and structural marginalization 
explanations, and, through the empirical material (see chapter 4), to advance the 
understanding of the interplay among different levels of explanation and offer a 
theorization of the attraction of radical Islamism. 
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The overall research question is the following: 
How can we theorize the attraction of radical Islamism in the West? 
Four of the five articles contribute to the answer of this question. Articles 1-4 analyze 
Islamist radicalization from subcultural and religious perspectives and thus, through 
the empirical material, contribute to understanding how we can theoretically grasp the 
attraction of radical Islamism in the West. Article 5 analyzes the methodological 
implications of doing qualitative research on radicalization (Article 5). The articles 
thus attempt to understand different but interrelated research questions or aims.  
The research aim of Article 1 is to discuss the relevance of a subcultural approach to 
the study of jihadism and to illustrate the relevance of this approach through an 
analysis of jihadi rap. The purpose of the article is twofold. First, it discusses how a 
subcultural perspective combined with intersectionality can enable a grasp of the 
interplay between micro- and macrolevel factors and a grasp of the attraction by 
understanding jihadism as a collective response to a shared experience of 
marginalization and othering. Second, the article analyzes the attraction of jihadism 
through the content, style, and aesthetics of jihadi rap. 
Article 2 expands on the first article’s focus on the subcultural style and aesthetic 
creativity related to jihadi subculture through an analysis of the relationship among 
rap music, Islam, and jihadism. By applying a subcultural perspective, the article 
analyzes how Islam always has been part of hip-hop coolness and how that contributes 
to making Western jihadi subculture cool and attractive. 
Articles 1 and 2 discuss how radical Islamism can be understood as an interplay 
between micro and macro processes by understanding radicalization as a subcultural 
response to a marginal and problematized position in society. Article 3 discusses how 
such a position can lead to a religious response. The article explores the question of 
how we can reinstate religion in the analysis of Islamist radicalization processes, and 
it does so by introducing and developing the sociology of religious emotion (Riis & 
Woodhead 2010). The aim of the article is to provide an analytical perspective that 
can help in the understanding of how social and political conditions can produce 
emotions that can be socially constructed as religious emotions, and why that could 
be attractive, through religious emotional regimes such as those found in radical 
Islamist groups.  
Article 4 applies the theoretical approach of the sociology of emotion (Riis & 
Woodhead 2010) to the interview material. The article draws on interviews with 23 
different actors with first-hand knowledge of Islamist radicalization, and analyzes five 
in-depth interviews with former radicals. It seeks to understand two questions: Why 
did they become religious? and What characterized the processes of radicalization in 
the radical Islamist groups they became part of? The article analyses their religious 
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response to their experiences connected to personal family social background that left 
them cognitively open (Wiktorowicz 2005). Thereby it connects different levels of 
explanation of radicalization and provides an understanding of why radical Islamism 
was an attractive worldview for them. 
Articles 1-4 all focus on why and how radical Islamism and radical Islamist groups 
can be attractive to young people in the West who identify as Muslim. The first four 
articles directly relate to the overall research question. 
Article 5 analyzes interview experiences with current and former professionals 
working in the prevention of radicalization and other people closely connected to the 
issue. The aim of the article is to understand What happens when one brings the 
concept of radicalization into the field? and What happens when the person who 
brings the concept of radicalization into the field is a non-urban, young ethnic 
majority male academic? The article reflects on the inherent methodological problems 
of talking about radicalization from a non-Muslim, white ethnic Danish researcher 
positionality (Bourdieu 2005). This article thus reflects on some of the methodological 
issues connected to doing research on hard-to-reach groups and sensitive topics. 
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CHAPTER 2. EXISTING RESEARCH 
This chapter will present and discuss existing research and current debates on Islamist 
radicalization that apply to the dissertation’s focus on radicalization as processes of 
subcultural formation and processes of development of religious emotions. The 
chapter will first discuss the existing research that relates to understanding Islamist 
radicalization as subcultural formation or processes. Second, the chapter will review 
the existing research and current debates on the role of religion in Islamist 
radicalization processes as it is related to the dissertation’s focus on religious 
emotions’ link to radicalization. 
2.1. EXISTING RESEARCH ON ISLAMIST RADICALIZATION AS 
SUBCULTURAL FORMATION 
It is not unusual to find the concept of “subculture” used in research on Islamist 
radicalization. Farhad Khosrokhavar (2009) noted that jihadism is a “subculture of 
violence” within the larger Islamic culture and that this subculture has “mutated” into 
a “subculture of death.” Crone (2015) argued that Islamist extremist milieus could be 
understood as “political subcultures.” Marc Sageman (2011) similarly asserted that 
terrorism emerges out of a “political subculture,” but also conceptualized a 
“subculture of extremism” and a “neo-jihadi subculture.” Anita Peresin and Alberto 
Cervone (2015) described a portrayal of a “jihadi girl power subculture” in ISIS 
propaganda. And, Hegghammer (2017b: 1) described radical Islamists as a 
“subculture” when he focused on the cultural practices within jihadist groups. 
Research on the cultural, stylistic, and aesthetic aspects of radical Islamism and 
jihadism often describe radical Islamist groups as subcultures, using adjectives such 
as “pop-jihad” (Dantschke 2012), “jihadi cool” (Sageman 2008), or “jihad chic” 
(Picart 2015). I will return to the value of these perspectives in regard to this 
dissertation, but the point here is that, even though the concept of “subculture” is often 
used, it is only rarely informed by the knowledge of subcultural theory and central 
debates within this field. As is the case with the examples mentioned above, 
“subculture” is instead used as a descriptive or neutral concept, perhaps even merely 
a term, to describe radical Islamists as (very) different from and in opposition to other 
more mainstream interpretations of Islam and/or Western democratic societies. The 
present dissertation argues that there is more to gain when/if we use “subculture” as 
an analytical concept and employ actual subcultural theory in our understanding of 
Islamist radicalization processes. This does, however, not mean that subcultural 
theory is entirely absent from the research field. 
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Subcultural theory in research on Islamist radicalization 
Perspectives on Islamist radicalization that draw on subcultural theory in their 
understanding of the phenomenon differ in their argument as to why and how such an 
analytical approach can be fruitful. This differentiation is mainly based on the various 
different understandings of the social background of those who are attracted by radical 
Islamist worldviews. 
In their work on making sense of the January 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, Sandra 
Walklate and Gabe Mythen (2016) argued that a subcultural approach could be useful 
in the understanding of the values of the perpetrators of the attacks. The perpetrators 
all came from deprived residential areas and Walklate and Mythen (2016: 338) 
asserted that, in order to understand the subcultural processes, we must take into 
account the structural context. An example of such a subcultural approach to 
understanding Islamist radicalization is Simon Cottee’s (2011) analysis of jihadism as 
a subcultural response to social strain. Cottee’s (2011: 731-733) aim was to 
understand why Muslim youths from secular Western societies and often with lower-
class backgrounds and not “religiously pious” were attracted to al-Qaeda inspired 
groups. In order to answer this question, Cottee turned to the classic subcultural theory 
of Albert K. Cohen (1955) and his analysis of the formation of delinquent juvenile 
gangs. According to A.K. Cohen, lower-class juvenile males are often status frustrated 
because they cannot live up to the criteria for success in the education system. 
Reacting to being defined as failures in school, they form delinquent gangs that have 
different values and measurements for success opposed to the norms of those who 
view them as failures. The gang can thus be understood as a collective solution to a 
structurally imposed problem (A.K. Cohen 1955; Cottee 2011: 737). According to 
Cottee, contemporary jihadism can be understood as a way to resolve young Muslims’ 
“twin problems of status-frustration and identity-confusion” (Cottee 2011: 738). 
Jihadism is opposed to Western democratic values such as gender and religious 
equality and values commitment to a specific interpretation of Islam over the material 
criteria for success. Jihadism also offers a cohesive identity as there are rules on most 
aspects of life and an opportunity to become a holy warrior (Cottee 2011: 738-739). 
We can then, according to Cottee, understand why jihadism can be attractive for 
Muslims in the West as it is a collective answer to a shared problem induced by social 
strain. 
The focus on social strain has, however, met some criticism among other scholars on 
Islamist radicalization employing subcultural perspectives. Daniela Pisoiu suggested 
that jihadists do not react to structural constraints as they come from different social 
backgrounds. Instead, jihadists are driven by a “need to resist Western norms and 
values” (Ahmed & Pisoiu 2017: 162). For her, the status involved in being a jihadist 
does not have much to do with a reaction to status frustration but rather as a way to 
gain status as such, as someone who has done something that is deemed “cool” or 
“dangerous” (Pisoiu 2015b: 16, 22). She thus rejects subcultural theories such as A.K. 
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Cohen’s and Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin’s (1960) illegitimate opportunity 
structure that describes how structural strain prevents working-class people from 
achieving middle-class status (Pisoiu 2015b). According to Pisoiu, what is needed is 
a subcultural perspective on jihadism that focusses on the importance and meaning of 
aesthetics, style, lifestyle, experience, and self-performance among jihadists. She thus 
employs subcultural perspectives from the Birmingham School (CCCS) focused on 
style, such as that of Dick Hebdige (1979) (Ahmed & Pisoiu 2017: 166; Pisoiu 2015a: 
167; Pisoiu 2015b). In her analysis of known jihadists, she found support for 
subcultural concepts, such as bricolage, homology, and resistance (Pisoiu 2015b). 
Cottee (2011: 743) argued for the need of more research on the “cultural architecture” 
of jihadism and what he calls “jihadi subcultural style.” In this regard, Pisoiu and 
Cottee seem to agree. Pisoiu has also discussed how known jihadists have mixed 
Western hip-hop and street culture styles with traditional Islamic clothing and 
symbols in processes of bricolage as ways of expressing resistance (Pisoiu 2015a: 
170; Pisoiu 2015b). This opportunity of self-performance and extreme levels of 
protest can hence be said to be what Pisoiu has described as attractive for young 
Muslims in the West in becoming jihadists. In this regard, Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen 
(2011, 2015) concurred with Pisoiu. Like Pisoiu, Hemmingsen (2015) criticized 
Cottee (2011) for being too structurally deterministic. She applied Theodore Roszak’s 
(1995) concept of “counterculture” to jihadism (see also Lentini 2013) (Hemmingsen 
2015: 8). Like Pisoiu, Hemmingsen turned to the analysis of the mixing of different 
styles and symbols in the jihadism counterculture as part of what would be attractive 
for Muslims in the West. First, she argued that the jihadism counterculture is the most 
high-profiled, and thus the most dangerous and cool. Second, she noted that the 
counterculture has a high potential of offering action and adventure, and third, that 
jihadism is a convenient choice as the public and political debate often labels Islam 
and Muslims as extremists (Hemmingsen 2015: 12). None of these reasons for the 
attraction of the jihadism counterculture included structural factors. Hemmingsen and 
Pisoiu can therefore be said to represent an employment of subcultural perspectives 
to the understanding of Islamist radicalization that sees young Muslims in the West 
as connected in their opposition to and resistance against Western societies rather than 
social background, as well analyzing this opposition and resistance through 
subcultural concepts such as style and bricolage. 
Other researchers that have taken a subcultural perspective on Islamist radicalization 
have contributed to research in the subcultural style and countercultural elements of 
jihadism. Some researchers have focused on the subcultural elements of propaganda 
material from terrorist organizations. Uliano Conti (2017) analyzed jihadist 
propaganda from Deso Dogg, a rapper who joined ISIS and became a prominent 
propagandist, through subcultural perspectives such as bricolage (Hebdige 1979). 
According to Conti, this form of propaganda and the bricolage between rap culture 
and jihadist culture makes jihadism understandable and identifiable for European 
youths (Conti 2017: 9). Jan C. Andersen and Sveinung Sandberg (2018) also focused 
on ISIS propaganda through a subcultural perspective by analyzing provocation 
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through extreme violence in the now defunct magazine Dabiq. A.K. Cohen (1955) 
described how individuals in deviant groups receive pleasure in the dismay of other 
people towards the actions of the deviant group. Andersen and Sandberg (2018: 13) 
employed this perspective to describe how the extreme violence portrayed in Dabiq 
is meaningful in a subcultural framework because subcultures “embrace and cultivate 
otherness” in their quest for detachment from the mainstream. The provocative 
display of extreme violence in Dabiq subsequently appeals to some in the jihadist 
subculture in the West. In line with this attraction to otherness, some researchers have 
asserted that a subcultural element of jihadism is exactly this pleasure of promoting 
and committing violence. Cottee and Keith Hayward (2011: 966) argued that terrorists 
are violent agents who are attracted by the extreme violence, and Pisoiu (2015a: 170) 
emphasized that a subcultural dimension not to be overlooked is the pleasure of 
violence and how it attracts those who enjoy committing it (see also Crone 2014). In 
a recent publication, Cottee (2019) furthermore employed David Matza and Gresham 
M. Sykes’s (1961) theorization of deviance as not at war with but broadly committed 
to the dominant value system, and pointed out that the violence and machismo of the 
jihadi subculture, as shown, for example, in ISIS propaganda, has parallels to the taste 
for violence in the dominant culture exemplified through the demand for more violent 
video games and mixed martial arts cage fighting (Cottee 2019: 12). Cottee (2019: 
14) thus argued that the attraction of jihadism is less mysterious than we might think. 
Terrorist communication and propaganda have thus been analyzed using subcultural 
perspectives that help grasp the mixing of styles and subcultural provocations and 
how these elements can appeal to young Muslims in the West.  
The reception of terrorist propaganda has, however, also been the subject of 
subcultural analysis. Although not drawing on traditional subcultural theory, Crone 
(2014) suggested that Islamist radicalization processes should (also) be understood as 
embodied and mimetic practices. According to her, young men from the West “pick 
up specific ways of speaking, walking, dressing etc.” from such media as YouTube 
videos with jihadists from ISIS that give them a specific appearance and demeanor 
that materializes their position of being part of a “militant subculture” (Crone 2014: 
299). In his study of the “subculture of internet jihadism,” Gilbert Ramsay (2011) 
similarly examined jihadism as media consumption by “ordinary jihadists” who likely 
will never engage in violence and the associated online subcultures. He drew on 
theories of fandom that are grounded in subcultural perspectives mainly from the 
CCCS, such as Hebdige (1979), and found that there is an idolization of prominent 
radical Islamist ideologues and that the lives and worldviews of the “internet jihadists” 
are affected by this fandom. 
The aim of the present dissertation is to better understand and theorize the attraction 
of radical Islamism given its specific social and societal circumstances. In this 
application of actual subcultural theory (and as a consequence thereof), the 
dissertation exceeds the division in the subcultural approach to Islamist radicalization 
between understanding the attraction as either based on structural strain or on an 
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aesthetic fascination. All the abovementioned subcultural approaches to radical 
Islamism can be said to focus in different ways on the attraction of jihadism. Cottee 
sought to explain this attraction as an answer to structural imposed strain. However, 
Pisoiu attempted to explain this attraction through style and self-presentation, while 
Hemmingsen did so through style and being part of a counterculture, and Andersen 
and Sandberg, as well as Cottee and Hayward, did this through the attraction of 
extreme violence and provocation. Yet, there seems to be a division between Cottee’s 
“structural” position and Pisoiu’s (and others) “stylistic” position. I, on the other hand, 
position myself in the middle of this division and suggest that these positions must be 
thought of together. In other words, concepts such as style and bricolage are central 
to a subcultural understanding of Islamist radicalization – on this, I completely agree 
with the authors promoting this application of subculture to the phenomenon – but, 
importantly, we have to take into account the social and societal circumstances of 
participants in the subculture in order to understand the meaning of the subcultural 
style. This means that subcultural perspectives on the social strain these participants 
experience are equally important. For example, if we are to understand the self-
realization that jihadists gain from going to Syria, then we must understand this in the 
context of the individual’s social and societal position. That is, the stylistic aspects of 
jihadi subculture are expressions of a specific societal position.  
The present dissertation also differs from most of the subcultural approaches to 
Islamist radicalization as it includes the broader supportive milieus in its analysis. It 
is exactly this supportive milieu that can be theorized as a subculture (see Articles 1 
and 2). Most research that employs subcultural theory to the understanding of 
contemporary radical Islamism has focused on jihadists/terrorists themselves and their 
stylistic repertoire and propaganda. I suggest that, by including the broader supportive 
milieu (or what Ramsay (2011) calls “ordinary jihadists” and Cottee (2019) calls 
“non-violent supporters and sympathizers”), we can better understand and theorize 
the social ecology of terrorism and what in the first place can attract people from 
specific social and societal circumstances to jihadism. Without employing subcultural 
theory, some researchers have described such an attraction through terms such as 
“jihadi cool” (Sageman 2008) and “pop-jihad” (Dantschke 2012), thus emphasizing 
the stylistic appeal of the jihadi subculture. The following sections will discuss this 
research and how it relates to the subcultural focus of this dissertation on the 
connection between rap, Islam, and Islamism (see Articles 1 and 2). 
Jihadi coolness and the aesthetic pull factors 
It was Sageman (2008) who coined the term “jihadi cool” in his description of the 
appeal of global Islamist terrorist groups. The economically and socially marginalized 
young Muslims of the “Third Wave” of jihadism, according to Sageman (2008: 158), 
have a desire to make something of themselves. Sageman thus argued along the same 
line as e.g. Pisoiu, however, he grounded this desire in their social and societal 
position. According to Sageman (2008: 158-159), the lack of positive local role 
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models for young Muslims in deprived residential areas, especially in Europe, have 
caused these young people to look up to terrorists who are perceived as fighting for 
the cause of Muslims. Sageman (2008: 160) then uses the concept of “jihadi cool” to 
describe how it has become “fashionable to emulate terrorists” both in the way they 
talk, what he describes as “jihadi talk,” but also in their actions, as joining Islamist 
terrorist groups is perceived as something cool. 
Since Sageman coined the term, several researchers on Islamist radicalization have 
used it or similar terms to describe how Islamist terrorist groups or organizations have 
tried to appeal to young Muslims in the West. Taking her point of departure in the 
jihadist milieus in Germany, Claudia Dantschke (2012) used the term “Pop-Jihad” to 
describe contemporary jihadists. According to her, and resembling the idea of 
Sageman, these jihadists see jihad as a lifestyle of “looking and sounding cool” 
(Dantschke 2012: 13-15). She, however, also noted that the Pop-Jihad movement is 
especially proficient in utilizing social media but also in producing what she called 
“Rap style Nasheeds3” in order to “directly access their main target group of 
adolescents” (Dantschke 2012: 13-14). Caroline J.S. Picart (2015) shares Dantschke’s 
understanding of jihadi cool as an “instrument” as she argued that the imagined status 
as jihadi cool (or “jihadi chic,” a term she also used) is an important part of Islamist 
terrorist organizations’ recruitment strategy. Picart also described how terrorist 
organizations create an image of jihadi cool through American vernacular and “MTV 
aesthetic” in their online magazines and merchandise (Picart 2015: 364). Similarly, 
Laura Huey (2015) investigated how “pro-jihadist ideologues” use political jamming, 
or memes, to make Islamist terrorism fun, exciting, or, in other words, jihadi cool as 
it appeals to young people who are already part of such an internet culture (Huey 
2015: 2). 
Even though researchers have not explicitly employed subcultural theory, they have 
explored the “jihadi cool” aspects of Islamist radicalization processes that include the 
stylistic and aesthetic dimensions of the phenomenon and discussed the mixing of 
Western street cultural style and jihadist or traditional Islamist style as part of what 
makes radical Islamism attractive to young Muslims in the West. However, their focus 
has been mainly instrumental as they have argued that jihadi cool is something that 
terrorist organizations use to appeal to young Westerners in their propaganda. The 
focus on propaganda is, of course, an important contribution to the research field, as 
terrorist organizations no doubt can be professional in their tactics of recruitment. 
However, the argument of the present dissertation is that the mixing of Western street 
cultural style and jihadist or traditional Islamist style is not only instrumental. Through 
the case of rap, this dissertation theorizes the attraction of radical Islamism as it 
discusses how Islam has always been part of hip-hop coolness and a way to show 
resistance against social and societal structures, and suggests that jihadi rap needs to 
                                                          
3 Nasheeds or anashid (plural form of the word nashid) is a form of Islamic chant (see Lahoud 
2017). 
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be understood in this light and not just as instrumental propaganda for recruitment 
(see Articles 1 and 2). The following section will discuss existing research on Islam 
and rap. 
The rap, Islam, Islamism connection 
Since the birth of the genre of hip-hop in the Bronx in the 1970s, it has addressed what 
has been perceived as injustices in the lives of minorities. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
what has often been referred to as the “golden age of hip-hop” (Khabeer 2016, 2007; 
Alim 2006), the critique of social injustice among black minorities in the US was often 
expressed in an Islamic vernacular in hip-hop. Many rappers in this era adhered to 
different versions of what has been called Black Islam (see Swedenburg 1997). To 
mainstream Sunni and Shia Muslims, the Black Islam versions of Islam can seem so 
unorthodox that they are categorized as un-Islamic (Khabeer 2016: 48; Swedenburg 
1997: 2). Black Islam is directed at the “systemic inequality” of Black communities, 
and it is an attempt to deliver an alternative and empowering understanding for Black 
individuals and communities of themselves (Khabeer 2016: 49; Rose 1994; Cheney 
1999; Knight 2016; Quinn 1996; McLaren 1999; Alim 2006; Aidi 2004). Examples 
are the Five Percenters, who understand the black man to have god potential 
(Swedenburg 1997; Knight 2016), and the Nation of Islam who believe that Black 
people can “regain their rightful position among humankind” through “knowledge of 
self,” in other words, through insight and a reinterpretation of Black peoples’ position 
in society (Khabeer 2016: 61). Samy Alim (2006: 46) has described Black Islam 
inspired hip-hop as “Muslim verbal jihad” and the rappers as “verbal mujahidin,” 
Suad A. Khabeer (2007) has described it as “Islamic hip-hop” and moreover as 
“conscious hip-hop,” and Felicia Miyakawa (2005) has described it as “God Hop.”  
However, it has not only been in the US that Islam has been part of hip-hop. Hisham 
Aidi (2004: 116) has described hip-hop as “the idiom for minority youth and urban 
activism in Europe” (see also Aidi 2014). An example is, according to Aidi (2004, 
2014), young political Muslim rappers in France whose songs often revolve around 
critiques of the life circumstances of socioeconomic marginalized Muslims in France, 
but also is often critical of the relationship between Islam and the West. Thomas 
Solomon (2006) analyzed German Turkish rap groups and found that they similarly 
rapped about experiences of racism but also promoted the unity of a “shared Muslim 
identity” and a way to revalorize Muslim identity. Kamaludeen M. Nasir (2016) found 
similar elements in Muslim hip-hop in Sydney, which he found always has had a 
“migrant element to it” that has criticized experiences of, for example, unemployment 
and racism (Nasir 2016: 81). There are thus several parallels between the critical 
vernacular of US Black Islam in US hip-hop and the critique of immigrants’ social 
and societal position included in Sunni Islamic hip-hop in other parts of the Western 
world. 
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The tradition of resistance and social critique in Muslim hip-hop from the “golden 
age” in the US to Muslim hip-hop in other parts of the world has links to the recent 
development of jihadi rap. What characterizes jihadi rap, and distinguishes it from 
other forms of Muslim rap, is that the critique of the geopolitical role of the West and 
of the life circumstances of Muslims living in the West takes a jihadist turn. It calls 
for a violent jihad against disbelievers (see Articles 1 and 2). According to Aidi (2014: 
207), European officials are scrutinizing hip-hop milieus in larger cities’ immigrant 
areas in order to decide which artists to “legitimize and which to push aside.” There 
is a concern about hip-hop artists whose songs have been described as “Muslim hate 
rap” as it can contribute to making jihad something cool (Aidi 2014: 206. See also 
Swedenburg 2009). Aidi (2014: 205) has linked this form of rap to “jihadi cool.” Such 
jihadi rappers include those that are discussed in Articles 1 and 2. The important point 
of this dissertation is, however, that this does not mean that jihadi rap (or jihadi cool) 
is always part of an instrumental propaganda machine orchestrated by terrorist 
organizations. The coolness of jihad needs to be understood in connection with how 
Islam has always been part of hip-hop coolness and a way to show resistance against 
social, societal, and global structures (see Article 2). Recent research on Islamist 
radicalization has concentrated on the movement of people from criminal street gangs 
to jihadist milieus. This has been termed the “crime-terror nexus” (Ilan & Sandberg 
2019; Basra & Neumann 2016, 2017; Hutchinson & O’malley 2007; Ibáñez 2013), 
“the crime-terror continuum” (Makarenko 2004), and “cross-over” (Christensen & 
Mørck 2017; Wilson & Sullivan 2007). In an instrumental understanding of jihadi 
cool and jihadi rap, we can understand this movement of people as a result of 
successful propaganda strategies. However, the argument of this dissertation is that, 
through a subcultural perspective, we can further understand this phenomenon in a 
less instrumental fashion that also includes the possibility that jihadi subculture and 
Black oppositional street culture (including rap and hip-hop) have emerged from 
similar frustrations. They share the same source, provide answers to the same shared 
situations, and are both oppositional. Therefore, it is quite logical that they would 
converge (Article 1). This dissertation theorizes jihadi coolness and, herein, jihadi rap 
as examples of one aspect of the possible attraction of radical Islamism for young 
marginalized Muslims in the West. A subcultural perspective can in this way help 
shed light on the social ecology of radical Islamist milieus. Radicalization as processes 
of subcultural formation has been explored in Articles 1 and 2. 
2.2. EXISTING RESEARCH ON THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN 
ISLAMIST RADICALIZATION PROCESSES 
The following sections will discuss existing debates within radicalization research 
over the role of religion. Cottee (2017: 443) separated different existing arguments on 
the role of religion (or the lack thereof) into two categories: “materialists,” who argue 
that jihadism is driven by structural factors and “idealists,” who argue that there is a 
direct link between Islamist ideology and violent action. Marranci (2006: 2-4) made 
a similar categorization and asserted that proponents of the argument that structural 
CHAPTER 2. EXISTING RESEARCH 
31 
factors explain Islamist radicalization would call the proponents of Islamist 
radicalization as driven by radical Islamist ideology “neo-Orientalists,” and that these 
neo-Orientalists vice versa would call the other side “Apologists.” The role of religion 
has indeed been one of the most debated themes in the research on Islamist 
radicalization, at least since the attacks in the US on September 11, 2001. 
The critique of the “religious terrorism” notion 
According to some scholars, it is widely assumed by policy-makers and the general 
public that an extremist version of Islam is the cause of contemporary terrorist attacks 
(see, e.g., Mills & Miller 2017; Dalgaard-Nielsen & Lund 2019; Kundnani 2012) and 
that this assumption is also present in research on terrorism. In his research on what 
he called “the myth of religious violence,” (Cavanaugh 2009) William T. Cavanaugh 
noted that, in order to say that religion is more prone to lead to violence than secular 
matters, there must be a sharp dividing line between the religious and the secular. . 
He, however, argued that this line is often crossed by scholars whom he labelled as 
“religion-and-violence theorists” (among others, he named Hitchens 2007; Rapoport 
1991; Juergensmeyer 1993, 2008; Wentz 1993; S. Harris 2004) (Cavanaugh 2017: 26) 
who include secular matters such as nationalism as a form of religion in order to “fit” 
their argument for the connection between religion and violence. According to 
Cavanaugh (2017, 2009), there are no empirical facts for claiming that religion is more 
prone to promote violence than secular matters (see also Francis 2016) and that 
reducing the cause of Muslim anger towards the West to their religion conveniently 
covers up Western aggression in Muslim countries (Cavanaugh 2017: 30; see also 
Mills & Miller 2017; Hafez 2003; Crone 2016; Boserup 2016; Lindekilde & Olesen 
2015). Jeroen Gunning and Richard Jackson (2011) similarly suggested that violence 
is violence and that deeming it secular or religious makes little sense, as the two, 
according to them, cannot be separated. Furthermore, they pointed out that, by 
labelling groups on the basis of religious beliefs, the assumption is that it is beliefs 
that cause a certain behavior rather than, for example, past behavior or organization 
dynamics, which they believed to be a more correct understanding of motivations for 
behavior (Gunning & Jackson 2011: 381). In his analysis of the violence of al-Qaeda 
and ISIS, Pieter Nanninga (2017a, 2017b) argued that asking about the role of religion 
would not facilitate the analysis because “historical, political, social, cultural, and 
religious” aspects of their violence cannot be separated (Naninnga 2017b: 184). 
Instead, he insisted what we should focus on why this form of violence has been 
framed as religious and that an answer to this question could be that terrorist groups 
benefit from the powerful message of framing their violence as religious (Nanninga 
2017b: 185; see also Badey 2002). 
In addition to this overall critique of connecting religion and violence, more specific 
reasons or arguments for why religion is not a main driving factor in Islamist 
radicalization can be identified in research on Islamist radicalization. 
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Three arguments for why Islam is not a main driving factor in Islamist 
radicalization4 
The following will focus mainly on Olivier Roy’s research as it illustrates some of the 
main arguments for why religion or Islam should not be seen as a main driving factor 
and because Roy has been engaged in a fierce debate with Gilles Kepel, whose 
arguments for why religion does play a significant role will be presented later. At least 
three arguments for why Islam is not a main driving factor behind the radicalization 
of contemporary jihadists can be identified in Roy’s research and in the general 
debate. 
One argument is that those who become radical Islamists only have low levels of 
religious knowledge and, thus, that their acts and thoughts cannot be deemed religious. 
Roy (2017) studied Islamist radicalization in France with a special focus on the 
“banlieues,” which are areas often defined by a large ethnic minority population and 
economic deprivation – and areas wherefrom many foreign fighters and domestic 
terrorists have emerged. His point is that the young Muslims from these areas are 
largely ignorant about Islam (see also Khosrokhavar 2017). This is, he noted, however 
not just the case with young Muslims in France. Referring to leaked documents of 
ISIS sign-in sheets, he stated that over 70% of the Western recruits to ISIS have only 
a basic knowledge about Islam (Roy 2017: 42; see also Dalgaard-Nielsen and Lund 
2019: 115). The underlying notion seems to be “that ‘truly’ religiously motivated 
actions can only be undertaken by people who have a high level of knowledge about 
theology” (Article 4). To underline this point, Roy furthermore stressed that we need 
to focus on when jihadists embrace religion and that this happens not long before they 
go into action (Roy 2017: 31). This is, for him, more evidence that their motivation is 
not religion or Islam. Others have also argued that contemporary radical Islamists are 
characterized by a lack of grounding in traditional mainstream Islam and that 
knowledge about Islam and a grounding in a “moderate” interpretation of the religion 
can function as a bulwark against radicalization (Aly & Striegher 2012: 869; Akers 
2010; Githens-Mazer & Lambert 2010; Patel 2011; Adamczyk, Freilich & Kim 2017).  
A second argument is that religion is used instrumentally. It is often claimed that 
“central persons, leaders or radicalizers use Islamic texts, verses from the Quran and 
holy traditions to mobilize and recruit actors for a political struggle” (Article 3) (see 
Hafez & Mullins 2015; Badey 2002). Furthermore, according to Roy (2017: 67), 
turning towards religion and utilizing some of the Islamist vocabulary and symbols 
can be a way for young identity confused and angry Muslims from the banlieues to 
show resistance towards a secular French society that has expelled Islam and religion 
in general from the public space. The argument is that, when “radicalizers” use Islamic 
                                                          
4 The following resembles arguments in Articles 3 and 4. 
CHAPTER 2. EXISTING RESEARCH 
33 
texts to recruit the next generation of fighters, it resonates with young people in the 
West who are looking for a way to revolt against society. 
A third argument is that “religion is used merely as justification of militant 
engagement and other violent behaviour (see for example, Crone 2010, 2014)” 
(Article 3). Roy’s point is that the young radicals use bits and pieces from verses from 
the Quran and hadiths to build their own imagery and to “throw in people’s faces” 
(Roy 2017: 43). What motivates them, according to Roy, is not Islam or religion as 
such. Instead, it is radicalism itself, which they then fit into a jihadist paradigm. He 
sees contemporary jihadists as representatives of a generation of nihilists (Roy 2017: 
53) that go to Syria to become martyrs and thereby make up for their sinful lives. 
Islam thus becomes merely a justification for engaging in violence and militant acts. 
Arguments such as these three for why religion or Islam is not a main driving factor 
behind Islamist radicalization, and the arguments against the connection between 
religion and violence covered in the previous section, have, however, been met with 
criticism among scholars who believe that we must take the religious aspect of 
Islamist radicalization and terrorism seriously. As discussed in Articles 3 and 4, this 
dissertation lies closer to the following views on the role of religion in Islamist 
radicalization processes. Taking the religious aspects of Islamist radicalization 
seriously is necessary in order to understand and theorize how specific interpretations 
of Islam are part of the attraction of radical Islamism. 
The critique of the “downplaying” of religion 
Assessing the research on Islamist radicalization and terrorism, Cottee (2014) has 
criticized what he has called a “systematic neglect of theistic violence” and Lorne L. 
Dawson (2017, 2018) has criticized the “inclination to minimize the religious 
pronouncements” of jihadists. This “systematic neglect” of the role of religion can, 
according Cottee (2014), Dawson (2017, 2018), Graeme Wood (2015), and Amarnath 
Amarasingam (2018), be attributed to a range of “interpretative prejudices” (Dawson 
2017: 33) or “biases” in the research field. 
One such bias has been termed the secular bias. Dawson (2018: 144) has argued that 
the secular bias can be seen among scholars on terrorism that understand processes of 
radicalization as solely to do with political grievances, and among scholars who reject 
the role of ideology overall in the radicalization process and, thus, also reject religious 
motivations as significant. Cottee (2014: 983) has criticized criminological research 
for understanding the criminal subject as essentially a secular subject (see also 
Amarasingam 2018). Although calling it a “Western bias,” Wood (2015) has similarly 
criticized what he perceives as an underlying assumption that, if religion does not 
matter much in a Western context, then it must also be irrelevant in other contexts 
such as Raqqa or Mosul. Another bias has been termed the religious bias. Dawson 
(2018: 143) asserted that the religious bias can be found in arguments that 
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acknowledge that all religions have a violent history, but “allow religion per se to slip 
the noose of condemnation” because they identify religion as something essentially 
good or having a “moral virtuosity.” Similarly, Cottee (2014: 984) claimed that 
criminological research on theistic violence has been characterized by a “pro-religious 
perspective” that has focused mainly on the crime-reducing effects of religion and 
almost never on the crime-producing effects. A third bias has been termed the liberal 
bias. Cottee (2014: 985-986) used the term to describe the reluctance to address 
Islamist theistic violence as caused by a fear of demonizing a religion that is already 
heavily criticized by the public and by right-wing politicians (see also Dawson 2018: 
142). Wood (2017: 20-21) argued that this fear, to some extent, has caused some 
scholars to be reluctant to speak about “unpleasant” parts of Islamic history, such as 
slavery, which, for example, ISIS has used as legitimization for their adoption of 
slavery. 
The critics of the various biases in the research on Islamist radicalization have pointed 
out that this “discomfort” in addressing the religious aspects of radical Islamist 
violence and radicalization is “a major obstacle in the analysis of movements which 
see religion as the overall framework for interpreting and justifying their actions” 
(Hoffman 2017). In all circumstances, as I have emphasized in Articles 3 and 4, biases 
such as these cause religion to be understood as a secondary explaining factor or an 
epi-phenomenon. The present dissertation therefore places itself in line with the 
critique of the downplaying of religion and aims at reinstating religion in the analysis 
of Islamist radicalization processes in order to understand and theorize the attraction 
of radical interpretations of Islam (see Articles 3 and 4). The following will thus focus 
on research that has argued that religion is an important explanatory factor in Islamist 
radicalization processes. 
Arguments for why radical Islamism is (also) a religious phenomenon 
As stated above, Roy has been in a fierce debate with Kepel over what role to assign 
religion in processes of radicalization. Like Roy, Kepel has also taken the French 
banlieues for his point of departure. But, unlike Roy, Kepel has argued that there has 
been a widespread Islamization of young Muslim from these areas (Kepel 2017: 197). 
The riots in France in 2005 where young Muslims took control over streets in some 
urban areas was, for Kepel, the pivotal year that laid the groundwork for the process 
of religious radicalization, culminating in the attacks on Charlie Hebdo. He asserted 
that this confrontational attitude towards French society fit well into the line of 
thought of Islamist movements, such as Salafism, which saw French society and the 
Western way of life as un-Islamic (Kepel 2017: 37-38). Kepel argued that these 
Islamist movements have contributed to “the establishment of a milieu favorable to 
ISIS” (Kepel 2017: 118), and he called the few that have committed criminal acts “the 
avant-garde of a larger Salafist trend” (Kepel 2017:66). This implies that Islam is not 
just a convenient identity marker used to rebel against society but that the period from 
2005-2015 can be characterized as an actual religious radicalization of some young 
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Muslims in France. Kepel has therefore placed more importance on the role of radical 
Islamist interpretations of Islam than Roy. The present dissertation agrees that radical 
Islamist interpretations of Islam must be taken seriously. It, however, also argues, as 
in Article 3, that “we can derive both a quantitative and a qualitative understanding of 
the role of religion from Kepel. He argues that a large number of young Muslims in 
the suburbs have been Islamized. Whether this quantitative argument is true and 
whether this is also the case in other Western countries is debatable. However, we do 
not have to accept the quantitative argument in order to accept his qualitative 
argument, which is that Islamist radicalization is (also) a religious phenomenon – 
those who are radical Islamists are religious” (Article 3). 
This argument can also be found among researchers who have explored and discussed 
the religious grounding of radical Islamism. Mehdi Mozzafari (2007) has claimed that 
Islamism, which he defines as “a religious ideology with a holistic interpretation of 
Islam whose final aim is the conquest of the world by all means” (Mozzafari 2007: 
21), has its grounding in the Quran. According to him, Islamists see the 
reestablishment of a caliphate as the only solution to the existing world order and that 
to reach this goal, violence and terror attacks are legitimate means (Mozzafari 2007: 
23-24). Mark Juergensmeyer (2003) similarly insisted that Islam has a history that has 
legitimized violence and that it contains theological concepts of a “cosmic war” 
between Muslims and non-believers. Similarly, in his study of the evolution of the 
ideas behind Islamist radicalism, Shiraz Maher (2016) argued that the brutal violence 
committed by radical Islamist terrorist groups is not irrational. According to him, all 
acts by these groups and individuals are grounded in a Salafi-jihadist reading of 
scripture (Maher 2016: 20), which, according to him, “can be considered Islam’s latest 
– and perhaps most successful – political religion” (Maher 2016: 27). 
In terms of the sharp division between religious and secular matters promoted by 
critics of the connection between violence and religion, for whom even the 
establishment of a caliphate should not be categorized as religious (Gunning & 
Jackson 2011: 376-377), these scholars on the religious grounding of radical Islamism 
claim that there are political dimensions of radical Islamism, but that this does not 
mean that radical Islamists are not religious. We can thus say that proponents of the 
argument that religion is not a significant driving factor present indirect empirical 
examples of what instead are driving factors, such as socioeconomic background. 
Proponents of the argument that Islamist radicalization is a religious phenomenon, on 
the other hand, have pointed to empirical evidence that religion, according to the 
radicals themselves, is a main motivational factor. According to Dawson (2017: 40), 
Osama bin Laden’s public statements were political and addressed specific 
grievances, but “this does not mean they were not also, or even more fundamentally, 
religious.” The point Dawson made is that political, or secular, matters cannot be 
separated from religion in radical Islamist thought. The attempt to dissect and uphold 
a sharp division between the secular and religious, according to Dawson, only makes 
sense if one accepts “Western liberal ideologies,” or what I earlier presented as a 
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secular or Western bias. Wood (2015, 2017) has indeed emphasized that ISIS, and its 
attempt to establish a caliphate, is very Islamic (see also Hoffman 2017). According 
to him, ISIS is a religious group with carefully considered and coherent beliefs. Its 
members “know a great deal about scripture, law, and theology” (Wood 2017: xxviii) 
and their actions only make sense as part of a religiously based commitment to 
“returning civilization to a seventh-century environment” (Wood 2015). Dawson and 
Amarasingam (2017) found that, among their 20 foreign fighter interviewees, none of 
them gave socioeconomical marginalization as a motivation for becoming a foreign 
fighter; instead, they all expressed religious motivations. In his study of the cultural 
practices of jihadist groups, Hegghammer (2017a) found religious practices to be 
central. He found that reading the Quran and praying even in the midst of battle are 
common practices among jihadist groups. Rukmini Callimachi (2015) found that ISIS 
members even prayed before committing rape. There are thus empirical findings that 
point towards the importance of religion for radical Islamists and terrorists. In a 
similar vein, Dawson (2017: 41) argued that, when Bin Laden addressed grievances 
with, for example, the US, he framed his statements in a “religious language” with 
references to the Quran and other scriptures and “not to other political sources of 
authority.” Whereas the argument among the sceptics who downplay the role of 
religion in Islamist radicalization and terrorism would be that framing the grievances 
in religious language is merely a tool of propaganda, the proponents for the argument 
that radical Islamists indeed are religious see the thoughts and actions of radical 
Islamists and terrorists as thoroughly framed by religion. Juergensmeyer (2003), for 
example, reasoned that images of “cosmic war” provide religious ideas that enable the 
occurrence of religious violence in the name of Islam. However, for him, “religion is 
not the problem, but it is problematic” (Juergensmeyer 2017: 17). This means that the 
initial problem is often economic and involves social tensions, but these tensions “are 
articulated in religious terms and seen through religious images” (Juergensmeyer 
2017: 19). This religious interpretation transforms the (initial economic and social) 
problem into an even bigger (religious) problem as it is perceived as a “cosmic war” 
against Islam (see Article 4). Social, economic, and geopolitical tensions are thus 
understood by the radicals as religious (see Dawson & Amarasingam 2017), which 
leads to religious (Islamist) radicalization, according to the proponents of the 
argument that radical Islamists indeed are religious. For them, the religious and 
political (or secular) cannot be separated. 
The present dissertation agrees with this point but also maintains that an adequate 
theorization is missing on how we can understand the connection between social and 
political conditions and religious matters in Islamist radicalization processes in the 
West (see Articles 3 and 4). The next section will address existing arguments for how 
we can reinstate religion in the analysis and will conclude with a positioning of the 
present dissertation in relation to this research.  
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The call for a reinstatement of religion in the analysis of Islamist radicalization 
An argument that can be found among some researchers on Islamist radicalization is 
that we need to understand that Islam can and has been interpreted in many different 
ways. The call for a reinstatement of religion has thus been formed by an emphasis of 
the anti-essentialist character of religion. Marranci (2006: 7) illustrated this by 
referring to two of his interviewees, who, according to Marranci (2006: 63-65), had 
read the same Islamic scriptures but had different understandings of the issues of jihad 
due to different life trajectories. One had lived his life in the marginalized suburbs of 
France, and he interpreted jihad as a final battle between Muslims and non-Muslims. 
The other had lived a well-off life in Italy, and he interpreted jihad as a spiritual quest 
for becoming the best version of oneself (see Article 3). This is an illustrative example 
of how an interpretation of religion is linked to social (or secular) matters. In Article 
3, I argue against essentialist approaches to Islam that claim that Islam is a religion of 
peace and or that Islam is an inherently violent religion. The point is that such 
arguments assert that Islam is only one thing. Similarly, Cottee (2017: 446) argued 
that “there is not one Islam, but a plurality of Islams.” The point of the anti-essentialist 
argument is that Islam, or religion in general, should be understood as a “resource on 
which people draw and which they use for a variety of private and public purposes” 
(Cottee 2017: 446). The proponents of an anti-essentialist approach to religion (whom 
I agree with) also argue against the idea that the level of religious knowledge is in any 
way an indicator of whether or not someone can have religious motivation for their 
thoughts and actions. Dawson (2018, 2017) thus stated that “the defenders of more 
conventional conceptions of the religious tradition in question can seek to distance 
themselves from the terrorists” but “they cannot logically […] say that the terrorists 
are not religious, simply because they conceive the religion differently” (Dawson 
2018: 149). 
Thus, the call for the reinstation of religion also calls for a way to explore or make 
sense of radical Islamists’ interpretation of Islam. Juergensmeyer and Mona K. Sheikh 
(2013) have argued for a “sociotheological” approach to understanding religious 
violence. Sociotheology implies the attempt to “understand the reality of a particular 
worldview” (M.K. Sheikh 2015: 136). The point is that, in order to understand how, 
for example, radical Islamists understand reality, we need to take seriously both the 
social location or context in which these understandings are formed and religion (see 
Juergensmeyer 2018: 29). A sociotheological approach thus “bracket[s] truth claims” 
as “the point is to try to understand the reasoning behind the truth claims, not to verify 
them” (M.K. Sheikh 2015: 137). In this line of thought, religion can (and should) be 
reinstated in the analysis of Islamist radicalization processes by taking radical 
Islamists’ own words, their worldviews, and the context in which they are formed 
seriously because this is the understanding of the world which they see as true and 
from which they act. Similarly, Dawson (2018: 149), drawing on the Thomas theorem, 
has insisted that “the only relevant issue is the perpetrator’s conception of the action” 
and that “it matters little whether the beliefs in question are fantastical” (Dawson 
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2018: 158). In his challenge of what he calls “the curious erasure of religion from the 
study of religious terrorism” (Dawson 2018), he concludes that the only way we can 
come closer to understanding the phenomenon of Islamist radicalization, and also 
come closer to how we can counter it, is to listen to what radical Islamists consistently 
say. For them, the role of religion in terrorism and politics is clear; they are strongly 
religiously committed (Dawson 2018: 159; see also Wood 2017: xxvi-xxvii; Hellyer 
& Grossman 2019). 
The present dissertation is inspired by the anti-essentialist understanding of religion 
and draws on the various arguments for the reinstation of religion in the analysis of 
Islamist radicalization processes in Articles 3 and 4. The dissertation is therefore 
critical of the proponents of the argument that religion is not linked in any significant 
way to Islamist radicalization. This is linked to the three arguments for why religion 
is not a main driving in Islamist radicalization. The instrumental, justificatory, and 
lack-of-knowledge arguments as to why religion does not play a significant role have 
been highly criticized by the proponents of the argument that radical Islamists are 
religious and that religion is a significant driving factor in Islamist radicalization 
processes, and I agree with their critique. However, even though such an approach as 
the sociotheological implies that we must understand religious worldviews as 
intrinsically connected to the social context in which they are formed, there seems to 
be an inadequate theorization of how we can understand the connection between social 
and political conditions and religiosity. Article 3 thus introduces and develops the 
sociology of religious emotion (Riis and Woodhead 2010) as a not yet employed 
theoretical perspective in radicalization research. This perspective would allow us to 
understand religious emotions as formed within the social context and how strong 
religious emotions connected to radical interpretations of Islam can also initiate and 
amplify a religiously-based motivation or reason to either endorse violence or commit 
violence in the name of the perceived true understanding of Islam. Article 4 offers an 
analysis of interviews with former radical Islamists and utilizes the perspective of 
sociology of religious emotions to show how their radicalization processes were 
characterized by an interplay between context-specific experiences and religiosity.
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CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 
This chapter will present the theoretical perspectives, which this dissertation draws 
on. It will first present developments within subcultural theory and, second, 
theoretical perspectives from the sociology of religion with a special focus on the 
sociology of religious emotions.   
3.1. DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN SUBCULTURAL THEORY 
The Chicago School  
The concept of “subculture” was established as part of mainstream sociology when it 
became a key concept in the work of the urban sociology of the Chicago School in the 
early twentieth century. Whereas deviant and criminal behavior had previously been 
interpreted as a result of certain “evil” personal traits, the Chicago School theorists 
pointed out that deviance should be understood as a “normal response” to the social 
and cultural context (Bennett & Khan-Harris 2004: 3; Brake 1985). Subculture was a 
key concept in the Chicago School; however, it was part of a broader stream of early 
American criminological subcultural theory, which was inspired by functionalism and 
understood the formation of and participation in deviant subcultures as serving a 
function or “solution” for the collective of the subculture. One of the key theorists of 
this approach to subcultures was A.K Cohen, who studied delinquent subcultures 
formed in and by the school system. He argued that the school is a situation in which 
“children of all levels come to compete for status in terms of the same set of middle-
class criteria” (A.K. Cohen 1955: 112) but where working-class boys are left with 
feelings of inferiority (A.K. Cohen 1955: 113-115).  A.K. Cohen (1955: 119) further 
maintained that, as the working-class boy values the criteria for middle-class status 
(which he cannot achieve or live up to) “he faces a problem of adjustment and is in 
the market for a ‘solution.’” This solution was the formation and participation in 
“delinquent subcultures” that provided “criteria of status which these children can 
meet” (A.K. Cohen 1955: 121) and which were the opposite of the middle-class 
cultural criteria, such as physical strength and defiance of authorities (A.K. Cohen 
1955: 132). Another example of such an approach to subcultures was Cloward and 
Ohlin’s (1960). Drawing on Robert K. Merton (1938), who described how crime can 
be considered a way to achieve commonly shared goals/ends by illegitimate means, 
Cloward and Ohlin asserted that people participate in criminal subcultures when they 
experience a blockage of conventional opportunity structure (Jensen 2018a: 406; 
Cloward & Ohlin 1960). 
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Early American criminological subcultural theorists were the first to argue that 
subcultures should be understood as attempted collective solutions to shared problems 
and that subcultures can function as a way to achieve desired goals (besides A.K. 
Cohen and Cloward and Ohlin, other influential theorists were Shaw and McKay 
(1942) and Miller (1958, 1959)). This focus on subcultures as solutions to shared 
problems was adopted (and rethought) by the next influential wave of subcultural 
theory, the Birmingham School. 
The Birmingham School (CCCS)  
The subcultural theorists (S. Cohen 2002 [1972]; Hall and Jefferson 2006 [1975]; 
Hebdige 1979; Willis 1977, 1978; for overviews, see, e.g., Brake 1985; Muggleton 
2005; Williams 2011; Jensen 2018a) connected to the Centre of Contemporary 
Cultural Studies, also known as the Birmingham School, in the 1970s represented a 
range of different approaches to youth subcultures, but some common denominators 
can be found among them (Griffin 2011). One of these was that the CCCS adopted 
the idea from the Chicago School that subcultures should be seen as creative cultural 
answers to shared problems of young people. However, this notion was rethought 
from a Marxist perspective. The Marxist approach meant the rejection of the idea from 
A.K. Cohen that working-class boys shared the ideals of the middle-class and that 
they were ashamed of not living up to those ideals. Thus, the CCCS added an analysis 
of “the politics of subculture,” which meant a focus on subcultures as both attempted 
answers to shared problems and as “manifestations of resistance and class dominance” 
(Jensen 2018a: 407). The CCCS understood society as being filled with class-based 
antagonisms and conflicts, and subcultures were seen as expressing this class conflict 
(see Jensen 2018a; Brake 1985; Muggleton 2005). Even though the CCCS 
conceptualized subcultures as collective “answers” or “attempted solutions” to shared 
problems of working-class youth, they understood these answers as symbolic in 
character because subcultures only provided “magical resolutions” (P. Cohen 1972: 
23) as participation in subcultures did not alter the life chances of working-class 
youths. In fact, some subcultures contributed to the self-damnation of the working 
class (see Willis 1977). 
Instead of relying on functionalism, the CCCS rethought the notion of subcultures as 
solutions to shared problems in terms of a focus on conflict and antagonisms, as well 
as agency and youth cultural creativity (Jensen 2018a: 408). This agency and youth 
cultural creativity was often analyzed through a focus on “style.” According to 
Hebdige (1979), the style of a subculture is a way to display meaning and acts as a 
“semiotic resistance to the dominant order” (see Barker 2008: 415). One of the key 
concepts to grasp subcultural style was bricolage. This concept was borrowed from 
Claude Lévi-Strauss and described “the re-ordering and re-contextualization of 
objects to communicate fresh meanings” (Clarke 2006 [1975]: 149). Hebdige (1979) 
used the concept of bricolage to describe how subcultures, such as the Mods and 
Punks, transformed and symbolically defiled clothing and objects from the 
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conventional society to signal they valued the perverse and the abnormal subcultural 
rather than dominant values (Hebdige 1979: 107). These were examples of working-
class subcultures who revolted against the class-based post-war British society 
through style. The CCCS understood forms of stylistic expression of revolt as part of 
cohesive subcultures. The connection between the structural position of the 
participants in these subcultures, objects used and appropriated by subcultures, and 
the value system of these subcultures was conceptualized as homology. Paul E. Willis 
(1978), for example, used the concept to describe the fit between the objects used by 
“motorbike boys,” such as the motorbike and its exhaust’s noise, and the masculine 
values and identities of the participants in the subculture (see also Clarke et al. 2006 
[1975]). 
The focus of the CCCS on predominantly white working-class boys and their 
formation and participation in subcultures was, however, criticized “from within.” 
Some theorists from the CCCS criticized the perspective for being male-biased and 
gender blind in its approach to subcultures (McRobbie & Garber 2006 [1975]; 
McRobbie 1980, 1990). Thus, Angela McRobbie set out to explore “what happens to 
the study of subcultures once sexuality, girls’ different (gender-defined) spaces and 
their different forms of resistance and accommodation are addressed” (Hall & 
Jefferson 2006: xvii). Another critique from a scholar closely related to the CCCS 
perspective was formulated by Paul Gilroy (1993) who emphasized that the CCCS 
had an inadequate theorization of race and ethnicity. He argued that there was a need 
for a focus on what happens to youth subcultures when racism, nationalism, and ethnic 
absolutism emerges within the subcultures and how this should be responded to within 
the rules and stylistic limits of the subcultures (Gilroy 1993: 2). Besides these internal 
critiques, there has also been external criticism that suggested abandoning the CCCS 
approach to subculture altogether. This approach was the post-subcultural tradition. 
Post-subcultural studies 
The post-subcultural critique of the CCCS was mainly directed at the CCCS’s political 
interpretation of subcultures as resistance against class dominance. One of the first to 
raise this issue was Stanley Cohen (2002 [1972]), who was both part of the CCCS but 
also part of the group criticizing the CCCS. According to him, the CCCS put too much 
emphasis on the symbolic meanings of the acts of participants in subcultures and too 
much emphasis on resistance (S. Cohen 2002 [1972]: lviii). Thus, for him, the 
participants in subcultures were not always political subjects or conveying a political 
statement, and style was not necessarily political. Post-subcultural studies were 
generally based on postmodern ideas of society as fluid and fragmented, and 
emphasized individual autonomy over collective action. Thus, David Muggleton 
(2000: 48) argued against the idea that there was a coherent dominant culture that 
subcultures could resist against. This led post-subcultural theorists to claim that the 
concept of subculture should be discarded altogether. Other concepts designed to 
grasp the fluid and temporary state of collectivities were thus employed. Andy Bennett 
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(1999, 2000) applied Michel Maffesoli’s (1996) concept of “neo-tribes” to understand 
contemporary dance music culture as the concept connoted loosely defined gatherings 
of people that one can easily step in and out of based on fun and pleasure. Sarah 
Thornton (1995: 3) reconceptualized subcultures as “taste cultures” in her study of 
club culture, which she understood as “communities with fluid boundaries.” Stephen 
Miles (2000) used the concept of “lifestyle” to explain the fluidity and shifting identity 
politics perceived to characterize contemporary youths. Others used the concept of 
“scene” to draw attention to the local sites of cultural production and consumption 
and to emphasize the anti-essential character of youth culture (Bennett & Khan-Harris 
2004: 13-14; see also Straw 1991; K. Harris 2000). All these concepts “accentuated 
agency, choice, reflexivity and individuality” (Jensen 2018a: 409), and they 
represented a break away from the Marxist inspired interpretation of subcultures by 
the CCCS. 
Adding intersectionality to subculture 
The post-subcultural focus on individuality and choice has, however, been met with 
some criticism. Shane Blackman (2005: 12) criticized postmodern theories of 
subculture for neglecting the role that social and cultural structures have on the 
choices available to young people (see also Hesmondhalgh 2005). A central critique 
of post-subcultural understandings of subculture was that it detached structural 
inequality from the analysis. Ben Carrington and Brian Wilson (2004: 78), for 
example, pointed out that contemporary dance cultures “exhibit patterns of class and 
racial differentiation that necessitates some form of materialist understanding.” 
Similarly, Tracy Shildrick and Robert MacDonald (2006: 126) criticized post-
subcultural theorists for tending “to ignore the youth cultural lives for less advantaged 
people” and that, as a consequence, post-subcultural studies had become less able to 
“uncover evidence of how class, and other social divisions, delimit youth cultural 
possibilities” (Shildrick & MacDonald 2006: 136; see also Shildrick 2006; Shildrick, 
Blackman & MacDonald 2009). 
Arguing along the line of the critique of post-subcultural studies to put “structure back 
in to youth subcultural studies” (Hollingworth 2015), Sune Q. Jensen (2018a) called 
for a theoretical dialogue between subcultural theory and feminist accounts of 
intersectionality. He argued for a subcultural perspective closer to the CCCS but 
agreed with the critique of a lack of adequate theorization of the interplay between 
social positions, such as class, gender, ethnicity, and race. He believed that, by adding 
intersectional accounts to the CCCS, such a theorization could be met. He 
conceptualized this perspective as “neo-Birminghamian.” This perspective was used 
in Article 1 and (to a lesser degree) in Article 2. The following section is based on the 
line of argument put forth in these articles (primarily Article 1).  
Intersectional theorists have asserted that intersectional analysis should grasp the 
interplay among micro-, meso-, and macrolevels of the social world (Choo & Feree 
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2010; Hancock 2007). Even though diverse, intersectional perspectives understand 
different social categories as mutually constituting each other. This means that social 
categories, such as class, gender, race, and ethnicity, are intertwined and that analysis 
should treat them as such, instead of as separate or parallel categories (Henne & 
Troshynski 2019: Potter 2013; Trahan 2011). “We are, as humans, never just men or 
women (or non-binary); we are also always positioned in terms of class, ethnicity and 
race in ways that have consequences for our gender identities, just as gender identity 
will have an effect on class identity, for example (Jensen & Christensen 2011)” as 
noted in Article 1 (425). Jensen (2018a: 415) insisted that accounts of intersectionality 
can aid in the understanding of the complex politics of subculture as they help us 
“grasp the complexities involved in both collectively shared problems and their 
answers, and [provide] analytical openness towards the politics involved in youth 
subcultural resistance” and that they “[add] theoretical sophistication to the idea of 
subcultures as collective and creative answers to a shared situation, contextualized 
structurally and with political dimensions.” 
Article 1 suggests that integrating the perspective of intersectionality into subcultural 
theory allows us to understand participants in jihadi subcultures in a way that includes 
their “classed, ethnic, gendered and religious positions” (Article 1: 425). The social 
marginalization, or othering, that many empirical studies have pointed to as related to 
radicalization (see Cottee 2011; Seierstad 2016; J. Sheikh 2015; Walklate & Mythen 
2016) can be understood as intersectional as it is related to age, class, and gender as 
young lower-class male Muslims are perceived to be particularly problematic. The 
point is that the interplay among the different social categories produces a specific 
form of social marginality and that the broader jihadi subculture should be 
“understood as a collective reaction to this marginality” and, furthermore, that this 
subcultural perspective also “provides tools for empirical analysis of the hybrid forms 
of cultural expression central to current jihadi subculture” which are expressions of 
the marginality (Article 1: 425). The argument of this dissertation is thus that, in order 
to understand and theorize why it can be attractive to become a participant in broader 
jihadi subcultures, we need to take into account the shared social position of the 
participants, as it is these related specific problems that jihadism as a subculture 
provides an answer to. 
The present dissertation places itself within and utilizes this subcultural perspective. 
However, the subcultural perspective is linked to the sociology of religion, which I 
will present. 
3.2. SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION – FROM RELIGION AS SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION TO A FOCUS ON EMOTIONS 
The field of sociology of religion has been characterized by debates about how to 
define religion and about what should count as religious. A key distinction has been 
between narrow and broad definitions of religion. This discussion composes an 
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immense research field that cannot be covered satisfactorily within the scope of these 
summary chapters; however, essentially, a narrow (or substantive) definition of 
religion hinges on identifying the “substance” or “essence” of religion, while a broad 
(sometimes referred to as functional) definition focusses on what religion does and is 
then more inclusive of differing forms of religion (see Roberts & Yamane 2016). 
Without going into this debate, this dissertation positions itself in a broad, social 
constructivist conception of religion as it allows “a theorization of religion that takes 
the subjective intentional explanations of the radicals seriously […] and thus focuses 
on the subjective meaningfulness provided by religion” (Article 3). The following will 
thus present a social constructivist approach to religion. This will be followed by a 
focus on religious emotions. 
A social constructivist approach to religion 
To understand the social constructivist approach to religion, we can start with Peter 
L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1983 [1966]), who theorized how reality is socially 
constructed through processes of externalization, objectivation, and internalization. 
Through these processes, human beings make sense of the world. In other words, 
human actors take the order of reality as something given, even though they 
themselves construct reality. They applied this understanding of social construction 
and order in their contributions to the sociology of religion. Berger (1973) saw religion 
as a way for individuals to make sense and meaning of experiences in the social world. 
When a meaningful order is established through religion, it can be given a sacred 
character (see Hamilton 2001: 181-182). Similarly, Luckmann (1967) understood 
religion as ways for individuals to acquire a sense of self. However, for Luckmann, 
religion included the so-called “invisible religions.” By this, he meant that individuals 
increasingly constructed identity, or sense of self, outside established religious 
institutions as a result of the secularization of society, but that this acquisition of sense 
of self was essentially a religious process (see Hamilton 2001: 184). Berger and 
Luckmann’s approaches to religion have been criticized for a number of reasons. One 
has been that Luckmann’s inclusion of “invisible religions” in the realm of the 
religious makes the division between the religious and the non-religious obsolete (see 
Berger 1973). And, Berger has been criticized for an overemphasis on the human 
desire for order and stability (see Furseth & Repstad 2007: 103-104; Beckford 2003: 
29). Without disregarding these criticisms, the dissertation builds on these early social 
constructivist conceptions of religion. It does, however, lie closest to the social 
constructivist conception of religion as derived from James A. Beckford (2003). 
Beckford’s (2003: 2) starting point was that religion is a social phenomenon. He  
reasoned that the means by which religion is expressed, such as human ideas, feelings, 
and practices, are products of social interaction and that they, in turn, influence the 
social and cultural life of individuals. According to him, social scientific studies of 
religion should aim at understanding these social processes whereby certain things are 
understood or constructed as religious (Beckford 2003: 3). This means that religion is 
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not an object that exists outside or is independent of human actors (Beckford 2003: 
4). He understood religion as an “interpretative category” that human actors apply to 
a range of different phenomena to make sense or meaning of them. He therefore 
insisted that analytical attention be placed on the ways human actors “do religion” in 
particular situations (Beckford 2003: 25). This implies a need for attention to the 
social context and that we should not think of religion as something generic or as 
bound solely to formalistic and institutionalized practices of religion. Beckford also 
inscribed himself within an anti-essentialist approach to religion. His social 
constructivist approach was not concerned with “truth claims” or “the reality status” 
of objects of religious beliefs (Beckford 2003: 2). This means that he made no 
assumption that, behind human actors’ use of religion, lies a “real” or “essential” 
religion (Beckford 2003: 20). Instead, his social constructivist approach reasoned that 
it is exactly the uses of religion that is religion (see also Marranci 2006). For Beckford 
(2003: 24), “religion is […] therefore ‘real’ in the sense of producing effects on some 
human lives and societies.” His social constructivist approach to religion was then 
also an alternative to understanding religion as an epi-phenomenon of social forces 
(Beckford 2003: 194). If phenomena are understood or constructed as religious, then 
they are religious. This also means that, even though there can be political, ethnic, 
cultural, and other forces connected to religion and religious conflicts, “religious 
conflicts are real in their consequences” if human actors understand them as religious 
in nature (Beckford 2003: 212). 
The dissertation draws on this social constructivist understanding of religion in its 
conceptualization of the role of religion in Islamist radicalization processes (see 
Articles 3 and 4). However, in order to understand the social processes of how things 
are constructed as religious for radical Islamists, I propose that it is fruitful to combine 
the social constructivist approach to religion with approaches to religion that focus on 
emotions as this can give insights into the link between strong religious emotions and 
the social and societal context in which they emerge and develop. 
The sociology of religious emotions 
Emotionalist approaches to religion understand religion as “derived from emotional 
or affective states of mind” (Hamilton 2001: 55). In his anthropological research into 
tribal societies, Bronislaw Malinowski (1936) found religion to be rooted in the 
emotional outcome of conditions of the everyday life of the inhabitants. Malinowski 
understood religion as cathartic as it provides human actors with a way to deal with 
the emotional stress that characterizes human life (Hamilton 2001: 59). Clifford 
Geertz (1966) had another view on religion and emotions. According to him, religion 
did not provide a way to get relief of or to avoid certain emotions stemming from 
societal pressure; instead, religion provided a way to live with these emotions and 
place them in a meaningful context so that people can understand and accept them 
(Hamilton 2001: 179). This resembles Max Weber’s (1995 [1920]) classic notion of 
religion as the main source from which people construct meaning and make sense of 
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their reality. This dissertation draws on these early theorizations on religious emotions 
and the construction of meaning. However, more specifically, it utilizes and further 
develops Ole Riis and Linda Woodhead’s (2010) sociology of religious emotions as a 
way to further understand and conceptualize how the emotional outcome of social 
experiences can be reinterpreted or constructed as religious emotions.  
Riis and Woodhead (2010: 4) criticized scholars of religion for being mostly 
interested in religious texts and doctrines and less interested in how religion affects 
the everyday lives of ordinary people. Their point was that it is only the few that 
intensively study religious texts. This is an argument for understanding religion as 
more than formalistic practices related to religious texts and doctrines. According to 
Riis and Woodhead, those with little religious schooling and those from economically 
marginalized backgrounds are attracted to religions that speak to the emotions (Riis 
& Woodhead: 4). Thus, emotions are at the forefront of Riis and Woodhead’s 
conception of religion. In order to understand how emotions become religious or what 
characterizes religious emotions, they stressed the importance of context. This means 
that emotions should not be reduced to an inner state or as something that is only 
private or subjective. Instead, Riis and Woodhead (2010: 5) argued, emotions are 
constructed in interplay between human actors and the social and structural setting 
they are a part of. Emotions are then understood as relational constructs. In the words 
of Riis and Woodhead (2010: 53), human actors are “always already located within 
complex patterns of social and symbolic relationship, and ‘emotion’ is a name we give 
to the multidimensional processes by which subjects navigate and negotiate within 
them.” It is a dialectical process where “our feelings shape our reality, and what we 
take to be real shapes our feelings” (Riis & Woodhead 2010: 67). A central point that 
this dissertation derives from Riis and Woodhead is that emotions are shaped by what 
people (and groups) perceive to be real and that emotions shape our understanding of 
reality. 
To conceptualize how “emotions relate embodied agents to their wider social and 
material-symbolic interactions,” Riis and Woodhead (2010: 69) introduced the 
concept of emotional regimes. They used this concept to emphasize that emotions 
structure the social life of, for example, families and fan clubs, but also of religious 
communities. They argued that such “social units” have emotional regimes, including 
(religious) elites and authorities, that structure what individuals can feel, how they can 
feel it, and how they can express their emotions (Riis & Woodhead 2010: 10). In order 
to further understand the emotional regimes of religious communities, they proposed 
the concept of religious emotional regimes. What distinguishes religious regimes from 
others is that they are socially constructed as religious. Thus, according to Riis and 
Woodhead (2010: 54) any emotion can be religious. They criticized scholars of 
religion who have claimed that religions inherently induce human actors to be kind 
and joyful (e.g., Armstrong 2007). Instead, Riis and Woodhead insisted that all 
emotions, including hatred and anxiety, can be religious. What makes them religious 
is that they occur “within a religious context and [are] integral to its social and 
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symbolic relations” (Riis & Woodhead 2010: 54). What furthermore distinguishes 
religious emotional regimes from other emotional regimes is that they relate to “an 
‘alternate ordering’ that goes beyond the orderings of everyday life” (Riis & 
Woodhead 2010: 70). This means that religion or religious emotional regimes offer 
an order to emotions that is perceived as true and foundational. By bringing an 
alternate ordering to life, religion offers a new structure of relationships and an 
emotional restructuring (Riis and Woodhead 2010: 70). Human actors are given a way 
to interpret and live their lives as emotions are understood in a wider (religious) 
perspective. Riis and Woodhead (2010: 11) also described how joining a religion 
includes the experience of a new way of feeling about self, others, society, and the 
world. 
Another point we can derive from Riis and Woodhead is that the emotional ordering 
of religious emotional regimes can also serve to identify who does not belong to the 
group (Riis & Woodhead 2010: 79). Riis and Woodhead (2010: 90) stressed that “that 
which threatens the objects of emotional trust and devotion is likely to be feared and 
condemned. Regimes that are experienced as incompatible, yet threatening, may be 
hated and aggressively attacked […] Religious passion can inspire people to kill and 
to sacrifice their own lives.” This is another important concept the dissertation derives 
from Riis and Woodhead as it points to the other/dark side of being assured of one’s 
belief and understanding of reality. This is explored in Articles 3 and 4. 
3.3. COMBINING THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM 
SUBCULTURAL THEORY AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
RELIGION 
The preceding sections have presented and discussed different theoretical perspectives 
that the dissertation employs in the examination and theorization of how jihadism can 
be attractive given the specific social and societal circumstances of individuals and 
groups. However, the subcultural perspective and the social constructivist and 
emotional perspective of the sociology of religion are connected in important ways to 
the analytical approach of this dissertation. The argument is thus that it is analytically 
fruitful to understand the social constructivist and sociology of religious emotion 
perspectives on religion as related to the subcultural perspective. In this way, we can 
understand part of the subcultural answer provided in Western jihadi subculture 
(Cottee 2019) as religious answers or reactions to their specific social position. The 
important sociological implication of joining a religious group is, as we can derive 
from Riis and Woodhead, that it gives a new way of understanding oneself, society, 
and the world. As explained in Article 3, it might also invoke a sense of empowerment 
through a perceived membership of a group of a “chosen few” or a religious omen of 
a greater purpose in life. It is a way to render intelligible why some young Muslims 
find it attractive to “adhere to radical interpretations of Islam, as they are ways of 
making underprivileged ethno-class experiences meaningful” (Article 3). This can 
thus be understood as a “religious” part of the subcultural answer to a shared situation 
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of economic or social marginalization and other issues such as perceived or real 
discrimination. As noted in Article 3, “previous personal feelings of anger towards 
society […] connected to being a Muslim can be transformed into strong religious 
emotions in a Salafi-Jihadist religious context.” By further developing the perspective 
of the sociology of religious emotions, we can then theorize how social and societal 
circumstances can be “answered” in a religious way in jihadist groups and how this 
can be attractive to some young people who identify as Muslims in the West. 
Furthermore, we can understand the formation of strong religious emotions as 
collective processes taking place within jihadi subcultural milieus. In this way, even 
though the perspectives are used separately in the articles (Articles 1 and 2 employ a 
subcultural perspective, while Articles 3 and 4 employ sociology of religious 
emotions), they are connected on an analytical level and complement each other.
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CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGICAL 
APPROACHES 
In 1988, Schmid and Albert J. Jongman published a review of terrorism research. They 
concluded that the research field was characterized by superficial methods and a lack 
of new data (Schmid & Jongman 1988). Andrew Silke (2001) conducted a “health 
check” on terrorism research from 1995-1999 and again from 2002-2004 (Silke 2007) 
and concluded that researchers still relied mostly on secondary data analysis. This was 
also a finding in Neumann and Scott Kleinmann’s (2013) assessment of the academic 
literature on radicalization from 1980 to 2010. Sageman (2014) furthermore claimed 
that terrorism research was in a state of stagnation. One of the reasons for why the 
research field on terrorism and radicalization have been characterized by a lack of 
primary sources and, thus, a less empirically rigorousness than other research fields is 
that the research subjects are hard-to-reach. Bart Schuurman (2018), however, found 
that from 2007-2016, the use of primary data increased considerably and that scholars 
had begun to adapt a wider range of different data-gathering techniques. This 
dissertation can be understood as part of this trend. The methodological approach of 
this dissertation can best be described as what Orvar Löfgren (1987: 78), with an 
inspiration from Lévi-Strauss (1969), called empirical bricolage. This means that the 
empirical material collected and analyzed in this dissertation is a result of the 
employment of a range of different methodological approaches. By combining 
different empirical material, I have attempted to battle the problem of the access to 
and the data basis of this hard-to-reach field of study. The following presents an 
overview of the empirical bricolage.  
4.1. OVERVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL BRICOLAGE 
Interviews: 
• Five interviews with former so-called radical Islamists (“formers”): 
Jens, an ethnic Danish male convert who had been convicted for 
planning a terrorist attack. 
Ali, ethnic minority man with parents from Somalia who was part of 
a group where three had travelled to Syria. 
Gittan, ethnic Swedish female convert, married to a radical Islamist 
convicted of planning a terrorist attack, and part of a strict Salafist 
milieu. 
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Emelie, ethnic Swedish female convert, married to a radical Islamist, 
and part of a strict Salafist milieu. 
Svend, ethnic Danish male convert and part of a group that wanted to 
establish a worldwide caliphate. 
• Twelve interviews with “professionals” connected with the prevention of 
radicalization: 
Chairperson of an organization that helps families who are worried 
about their children in relation to radicalization issues. 
Prison priest with personal knowledge of radicalization processes 
inside and outside the prison system. 
Two interviews with a leader of a youth club in an area that has seen 
several cases of radicalization. He was also a former professional 
within the work of prevention of radicalization. 
Prison guard with knowledge about radicalization in prison. 
Group interview with three men from an organization which helps 
marginalized youths considered at risk of radicalization. 
“Street worker” with both professional and personal knowledge about 
radicalization processes. 
Municipality employee working with radicalization issues and with 
personal knowledge of radicalization processes. 
Former mentor for youths at risk of radicalization. 
Representative from an organization that helps marginalized youths 
considered at risk of radicalization. 
Leading figure in a prevention of radicalization model in Denmark. 
Key person within municipality work, prisons, and intelligence 
service on radicalization issues in Denmark. 
• Interviews with other people related to the issue of radicalization: 
 Representative from a mosque. 
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Former inmate with personal knowledge of former foreign fighters 
and radical Islamist milieus in Denmark.  
Person closely related to a group with which several foreign fighters 
allegedly were affiliated. 
Spokesperson from a mosque that several foreign fighters allegedly 
have been in close contact with. 
Journalist who has been in Syria several times and knows several 
foreign fighters and other radicalized people. 
Journalist with close contact to people who have been part of al-
Shabaab. 
Access to interview transcripts of interviews conducted by Umair 
Ahmed and Lasse Simo Friis Hansen, students of Sune Qvotrup 
Jensen, including interviews with Ali (the same former radical 
interviewed for this dissertation), three imams, police personnel 
working with the prevention of radicalization, and a local 
neighborhood crime prevention personnel. 
Biographical and journalistic sources used in articles and as background 
material: 
Soei, A. (2018). Omar - og de andre - vrede unge mænd og 
modborgerskab [Omar – and the Others – Angry Young Men and 
Counter-citizenship]. Copenhagen: Gads Forlag. 
Khaja, N. (2017). Du må ikke græde - for så mister du blod. 
Reportager fra borgerkrigen i Syrien [You Must Not Cry – Because 
You Will Lose Blood. Reports From the Civil War in Syria]. 
Copenhagen: Gyldendal. 
Sheikh, J. (2015). Danmarks børn i hellig krig [Denmark’s Children 
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Virtual ethnography 
Virtual ethnographic inspired research on the symbolic and stylistic 
cultural repertoire of jihadi subculture, consisting of jihadi rap 
material such as songs, videos, and lyrics. 
 
4.2. ACCESS TO A HARD-TO-REACH FIELD – RECRUITING 
INTERVIEWEES 
John Horgan (2012) argued that research on radicalization for different reasons is 
characterized by a lack of descriptions of the processes of gaining access. This chapter 
should be seen as a contribution to offsetting this. This section will focus on the 
process of recruiting interviewees, which reflects the hard-to-reach character of the 
research field and the sensitive topic of radicalization (see Article 5). Recruiting the 
interviewees involved several obstacles. Briefly put, I followed strategies such as 
Amarasingam and Dawson’s (2018: 8) and decided to speak to anyone who would 
speak to me. In respect to the conception of empirical bricolage introduced in the 
introduction to this chapter, the interview part of my empirical material was therefore 
in itself a form of bricolage. 
Attempting to access the radicals themselves and family members 
In the beginning of the research process, I had the ambition of interviewing radical 
Islamists themselves, or their family members, who could speak about radicalization 
processes from a deep personal knowledge (see Speckhard 2009; Amarasingam & 
Dawson 2018). However, I never succeeded in getting access to these interviewees. 
One of the strategies I used was through snowballing and gatekeepers. Horgan (2012: 
204) emphasized that one access route to interviewees in the field of radicalization 
research is through “formal contact with other gatekeepers.” As I will describe below, 
I did succeed in getting interviews with current and former professionals connected to 
the work within the prevention of radicalization and other people closely related to 
the issue of radicalization. As a strategy, I asked all these interviewees if they knew 
current or former radical Islamists or family members that would be interested in 
speaking to me. In that way, I attempted to use the interviewees as gatekeepers. Some 
of the “attempted gatekeepers” refused to put me in contact with people of interest as 
they wanted to protect their relationship with them. However, the majority of the 
attempted gatekeepers knew people of interest and were willing to facilitate contact 
with them. However, I often did not hear back from the attempted gatekeepers, even 
though I contacted them several times after the interviews. Those who did contact me 
again said that the people of interest that they knew did not want to talk to me. This 
was most likely an issue of trust. When doing research in hard-to-reach fields and 
research on sensitive topics, access often relies on how the researcher is perceived in 
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the eyes of the research subjects (see Article 5; for an overview, see Jensen 2018b; 
Yates 2004). Even though the attempted gatekeepers had the trust of the people they 
knew, and even though the gatekeepers could vouch for me and were asked to say that 
the interviews would be anonymized and not compromise their safety or legal status 
in any way, the current or former radicals and family members still did not want to 
participate (the recruitment of the formers that I did succeed in recruiting will be 
described below). Talking with or about current people involved in radical Islamist 
milieus always involves a risk of admitting things that, if learned by law enforcement, 
could lead to legal investigations (Speckhard 2009: 200), and this could have affected 
the potential interviewees’ decision of not wanting to participate. 
Another strategy I employed was contacting known foreign fighters and family 
members of foreign fighters directly via personal messages on Facebook. In total, I 
contacted seven people in this way. Before travelling to Syria as a foreign fighter was 
given the same legal and security attention as it later was, some people from Denmark 
went there and came back. I wrote to them, rather naïvely I realize now in in retrospect, 
that I had heard that they had been to Syria, that I was doing a research project on 
Islamist radicalization processes in Denmark, and that I would like to talk to them. 
Not surprisingly, I never heard back from any of them. However, in the same way, I 
contacted family members of known foreign fighters from Denmark. One, who had a 
brother who had died in Syria fighting for ISIS, said that he did not want to participate 
in anything. Another, who had two brothers who died fighting for ISIS, said that he 
liked the premise of my research project of understanding why young people from 
Denmark would find it attractive to join ISIS; however, he replied that the loss of his 
brothers was still too painful for him to talk about. Thus, there were both aggressive 
rejections and rejections due to emotional reasons. The other family members of 
known foreign fighters whom I contacted never replied. 
These are of course issues that have to do with trust when trying to interview 
“reluctant respondents” (Adler & Adler 2001). Put another way, I was simply “too far 
away” to be able to gain their trust. This distance can be described in terms of social 
positionality. Being a white, ethnic Danish academic, I may have been seen as simply 
too different from the potential interviewees’ point of view and maybe as a 
representative of a Danish society that they may have experienced as critical or hostile 
towards Muslims. This can have added to their perception of me as untrustworthy. 
Recruiting interviewees from radical Islamist milieus or their family members would 
have required more time-consuming strategies in order to build up trust, such as what 
was done by Hemmingsen (2011) who attended trials in order to gain access to radical 
Islamist milieus, but such strategies would also not have guaranteed success. In 
describing her interviews with people involved in Islamist terrorism around the world, 
Anne Speckhard (2009: 205) explained that access to terrorists is the most difficult in 
societies where counter-terrorism measures are active. Denmark would surely be such 
a place. I therefore opted for an alternative solution. Instead of interviewing current 
RADICAL ISLAMISM AS AN ANSWER 
54 
radical Islamists, I decided to try to recruit former radical Islamists, also known as 
“formers.” 
Recruiting formers 
Whether or not formers are a reliable or fruitful source of information about 
radicalization processes has been a discussion in the research field. Marina Tapley 
and Gordon Clubb (2019) cautioned that formers’ investment in turning their back on 
their past might lead to exaggeration or an overselling of their previous experiences. 
Speckhard (2009) noted that formers might have useful data but that the data they can 
provide is necessarily “dated.” Contrarily, Horgan (2012: 203) asserted that the 
purpose of interviewing formers is to grasp past experiences and processes of 
radicalization, and that they are often willing to disclose substantial details about their 
life. Similarly, Marco Nilsson (2018) argued that formers are in a good position to 
self-evaluate why they became radical Islamists and can reflect on their experiences. 
As will be shown further on, this was also the case of the formers interviewed for this 
study. I agree with Horgan and others that formers are a fruitful way of obtaining data 
on processes of radicalization from people who themselves have experienced such 
processes on their own body, even though there are of course possible biases when 
interviewing formers. The interviews with the formers will be discussed below. Here, 
I will deal with how I recruited the five formers interviewed for this dissertation. 
The first former that was interviewed was Jens. I initially contacted him through a 
journalist. Horgan (2012) listed journalists as potential gatekeepers in this hard-to-
reach field (see also Juergensmeyer 2020: 57). I knew that Jens had previously been 
in contact with a specific journalist and had made appearances in Danish media about 
his life in the radical Islamist milieu in Denmark. Consequently, I contacted the 
journalist via email and wrote that I had seen Jens in the media and that I thought it 
looked like the journalist and Jens had a close relation and that going through the 
journalist could be a productive way of coming into contact with Jens. The journalist 
forwarded my email to Jens with a note that he could contact me about an interview. 
After a while, Jens wrote an email to me stating that only a fraction of his story was 
told in the media and asked what I believed he could contribute to my research project. 
I wrote that his story could give valuable insight into how some people end up in 
radicalized milieus, and also that it could help prevent others from going through the 
same processes as Jens. I also promised him anonymity. He replied that he was keen 
on letting others learn from his experiences and that he would like to participate in an 
interview. The successful recruitment of Jens as an interviewee had first depended on 
his trustworthy relationship with the journalist, and second on Jens’s desire to 
contribute to preventing Islamist radicalization through his own story. 
The second former that was interviewed was Ali. He was initially contacted through 
the criminologist Umair Ahmed, who was a student of Jensen. Ahmed functioned as 
a gatekeeper. Using connections of former students is not unusual in research on 
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radicalization and terrorism (see Juergensmeyer 2020: 58). Ahmed gave Ali’s email 
address to Jensen. Jensen wrote to Ali that we believed we could learn a lot from his 
radicalization experiences, that we would like to interview him, and that he would be 
anonymized. Ali agreed to be interviewed. The successful recruitment of Ali, as in  
the case with Jens, had depended on the relation of trust between him and a 
gatekeeper. 
The third former that I interviewed was Gittan. She was recruited directly by me. She 
had gone public about her experience of going in and out of radical Islamist milieus, 
so I contacted her via a personal message on Twitter. I wrote that I was very interested 
in hearing about her experiences, and that interviewing her also would be part of a 
larger goal of helping in preventing Islamist radicalization. She replied that she “of 
course” wanted to participate. Much like Jens, the successful recruitment of Gittan, to 
a large extent, was a result of her wanting to help prevent radicalization by telling her 
story to me. 
Concerning her experiences with interviewing radical Islamists, Speckhard (2009: 
206) reported that interviewees who had a positive interview experience often led the 
researcher to other potential interviewees. This form of snowballing resulted in the 
recruitment of the fourth former that I interviewed, Emelie. In the end of the interview, 
I asked Gittan if she knew other people like herself that had been through 
radicalization experiences. After the interview, Gittan sent my email to Emelie, who 
later contacted me. She wrote that she would like to participate in an interview with 
me as she had been part of a “strict Salafist network.” I replied that her story would 
be of great relevance to my research. She replied that it felt good that she was going 
to contribute to research on this matter. The recruitment of Emelie was first dependent 
on her relationship with Gittan, and that Gittan was willing to facilitate the contact. 
Second, Emelie was very keen to participate as she hoped her story could help prevent 
others from becoming radical Islamists. 
The fifth former that I interviewed was Svend. Much like the case with Gittan, I 
contacted him directly, as he had been in the media about his experiences with the 
radical Islamist milieu in Denmark. At the time, he worked in the prevention of 
radicalization, and I contacted him via email to ask if he wanted to participate in an 
interview. He said that he did not want to talk about prevention of radicalization, as 
such, but that he would only talk about his own experience going into, being part of, 
and coming out of the radical Islamist milieu. The recruitment of Svend relied on him 
being able to tell his story, which was also the purpose of the interview. 
Choice of words is important when interviewing people about sensitive topics (see 
Adler & Adler 2001) such as radicalization. Instead of the word “terrorism,” 
Speckhard (2009: 209), for example, used “martyrdom operations” when contacting 
potential interviewees. As was the case with the preparation for the interviews with 
the people working within the prevention of radicalization and other people related to 
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the issue of radicalization (as described in Article 5), I knew that radicalization, Islam, 
and Muslims, in general, are a highly debated issues in Denmark and that the concept 
of radicalization is ethnicized and inscribed in a specific discourse. In my recruitment 
of the formers, however, I used the concept “Islamist radicalization,” as I had to live 
up ethical standards of informed consent (see also Article 5). Most of the formers that 
I contacted did not express concern or criticism about the concept prior to the 
interview. However, two former Islamists that I managed to find and contact did not 
result in interviews. One did not reply, even though I got his contact information from 
a journalist he had previously worked with and trusted. The reason that the other did 
not want to participate, however, did not only relate to the choice of the word of 
“radicalization” but also to the theoretical approach of the study as he criticized the 
project’s focus on “masculinity studies and radicalization” as one of the latest “trend 
theories” about why people want to join conflicts and battles. 
Recruiting “professionals” and other people related to the issue of Islamist 
radicalization 
Interviewing formers can be seen as a workaround in terms of doing research on this 
hard-to-reach group. Another workaround that I employed was to interview 12 
different actors working within the prevention of radicalization, and six other people 
related to radicalization issues. However, eight professionals working within the 
prevention of radicalization and seven other actors related to radicalization declined 
to be interviewed or never responded. The process of recruiting these different actors 
for interviews also reflected that doing research on radicalization is doing research on 
a hard-to-reach field and a sensitive topic. 
The preparation prior to contacting the interviewees and what I said to them and the 
thoughts behind the wording I used have been discussed in depth in Article 5, so I will 
not go further into this here. Here, through typical examples, I will describe how I 
found the professionals and other actors related to the issue of radicalization. The 
recruitment strategies can be described as snowballing and personal contacts. An 
example was the recruitment of a prison priest. A colleague in the criminology 
department at Aalborg University suggested that I contact the prison priest whom she 
had worked with in another research project. I wrote an email to the priest asking if 
she would be interested in an interview about radicalization processes, which she was. 
After the interview, she told me about a monthly event she organized where current 
and former inmates came to her meeting room in a large city in Denmark and talked 
about different subjects. She suggested that I attend these meetings, as it could be a 
way to gain trust among some of the current and former inmates that could be of 
interest of me to talk to. I attended three of these events. I then tried to approach some 
of the current and former inmates whom the prison priest thought would be especially 
relevant for me to talk to. This led to conversations in the meeting room during breaks. 
Some of these conversations did not amount to any actual usable or relevant empirical 
material, but they did help build my trustworthiness among the attendants of the 
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meetings. Consequently, I did get the contact information of one current and one 
former inmate of interest concerning the issue of radicalization. I was in contact with 
the current inmate over the phone some months after the meeting, but when I called, 
he could not talk. I was never able to reach him again. However, I did manage to come 
in contact with the former inmate. He was willing to participate in an interview, and 
we met up some months after the event to do the interview. He was a former inmate 
who had been in prison with several foreign fighters, and he was from an area where 
he knew several people involved in radical Islamist milieus. Another interviewee that 
I recruited from the meetings with the prison priest was a prison guard that drove the 
inmates from the prison to the meeting in the city. During one of the meetings, I 
interviewed him in an adjacent room about his knowledge of radicalization in the 
prison system and outside. The interview with the prison priest was thus an example 
of how personal contacts lead to interviews that then lead to further snowballing. 
Another example was an interview with a former mentor for young people who were 
suspected of moving towards radical Islamist milieus. I had met him at a conference 
on prevention of radicalization and in other settings, and during our talks, I asked if 
he would be interested in participating in an interview with me. This interview lead to 
an interview with a person within law enforcement closely linked to the work on 
prevention of radicalization, as the former mentor had worked with him earlier and 
gave me advice on how to contact the law enforcement interviewee. A third example 
was an interview with a representative from a mosque that was facilitated through the 
aforementioned Umair Ahmed. 
Using gatekeepers was, however, not always successful. In several cases, I called 
people that I knew from earlier research projects that I believed might be able to put 
me in contact with different relevant actors. Yet, even though my gatekeepers often 
gave me names and contact information of specific people, I often never heard from 
them or was rejected in my proposal for an interview. Predominantly, these rejections 
came from local neighborhood associations, whose members I wanted to interview 
because of their close knowledge of youth culture in their specific areas. However, 
either they did not respond or they rejected my proposal for an interview saying that 
they did not want to participate in an interview about radicalization. One way to look 
at these forms of rejection can be as another case of a lack of trust. In order for me to 
obtain these interviews, I would likely have had to have a closer relationship or 
connection to the local associations – even if the gatekeepers vouched for me. 
In other cases, however, I contacted the interviewees directly. I researched who had 
positions or ran organizations that revolved around the prevention of radicalization, 
and I contacted them through email or over the phone, explained my research interest, 
and asked if they would be interested in participating in interviews. The majority 
accepted to be interviewed, but some did not want to participate in an interview about 
radicalization (see Article 5). I also directly contacted two mosques. After contact 
through email, a representative from one of the mosques agreed to an interview. The 
other mosque was contacted through its official Facebook page. After explaining my 
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research interest in radicalization processes and after several months, I finally got the 
answer that they could not help me with respect to this particular subject. 
Recruiting “professionals” and other people related to the issue of radicalization 
turned out to be a workaround in terms of doing research on the hard-to-reach group 
of radical Islamists. These individuals were, to a certain degree, accessible 
interviewees. There were, however, still rejections because of the interview’s focus 
on radicalization. The sensitive character of the concept of “radicalization” has been 
dealt with in Article 5. 
4.3. INTERVIEWING THE FORMERS 
The following section will describe the interviews with the five formers. The section 
will describe the setting of the interviews and positionality between me and the 
interviewees, my interview approach, ethical concerns when interviewing formers, 
and how the interviews were coded. 
Setting and positionality 
In my correspondence with the five formers prior to the interviews, I made it clear 
that they could choose the place and time for the interview. My main goal was to get 
the interviewees to feel as comfortable as possible in a situation where they were going 
to talk about their personal (and sensitive) radicalization experiences. As a result of 
letting them choose the place of the interviews, the interview settings differed across 
the five interviews. Common to all the face-to-face interviews was, however, that I 
brought different snacks, cake, sodas, or cookies to the session. This was an attempt 
to make the interviewees feel more comfortable. Reflecting on her interviews with 
terrorists, Speckhard (2009: 216) described how she never showed up to an interview 
empty handed but always brought chocolates or some other gifts. I never saw the 
snacks that I brought to the interviews as being gifts. They was meant as something 
that could be shared during the interview and could help ease the potential tense 
interview situation and facilitate an atmosphere where the interviewees would be more 
willing to share their personal stories. 
Another common aspect of the interviews with the five formers was that four of them 
had told about their radicalization processes in other settings previously. Some had 
publicly told about their experiences to journalists, while others had held presentations 
connected to the work on prevention of radicalization about their experiences or talked 
to social workers. In some sense, they were thus a kind of “trained speakers.” I believe 
that this affected the positionality in the interviews. Having told about their 
experiences before, the formers had also been asked questions about their earlier life 
by a range of different people. My positionality as a relatively young, ethnic Danish, 
presumed Christian academic was in many ways different from the positionality of 
the formers. Even though four of them were converts and were ethnic Danish (or 
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Swedish), they had had life trajectories vastly different from mine and three of the 
formers still identified as Muslims. However, they all were willing to talk about their 
experiences. As I explored in Article 5, the professionals and other actors related to 
Islamist radicalization that I interviewed often wanted to discuss the concept of 
radicalization. Apart from one former, Ali, who in the end of the interview stated that 
he preferred to use the word “extremist,” none of the formers engaged in discussions 
about terminology. They were, in fact, very willing tell their radicalization experience 
to me and answer my questions. This may have been the result of them being trained 
speakers used to being asked questions. Being trained speakers could have mitigated 
the differences between the interviewees and me. Another way of mitigating 
differences between us was finding a common ground in a critique of Western 
aggressions in Muslim countries, which most of the formers still found critical and 
initiated discussions about in the interviews. This was common in most of the 
interviews with the formers; however, the following will describe more in detail the 
positionality and the settings of the different interviews. 
The first interview was with Jens, an ethnic Danish convert to Islam who had been 
committed of planning a terrorist attack. This interview is described in detail as it 
exemplifies common themes regarding setting and positionality experienced in the 
other interviews. I was the lead interviewer, but Jensen also asked questions. We both 
decided to participate in the interview for two reasons. One was academic; as it was 
the first interview with a former, we both attended it so that we could complement 
each other during the interview and both discuss if the interview guide should be 
revised for the next interviews. The other reason was related to security. Even though 
we knew that Jens had talked to a journalist and that he no longer adhered to radical 
interpretations of Islam, we did see it as a security precaution to both attend the 
interview. This was related to the different positionalities between us and Jens. He 
had adhered to a worldview very different from (and hostile towards) what we would 
be perceived as adhering to in respect to our particular positionality. Meeting Jens, 
however, defused any concerns in this regard. Prior to the interview, Jens wrote an 
email saying that he preferred that the interview would take place in his apartment in 
a large city in Denmark. However, a few days before the interview, he changed the 
venue and wanted the interview to take place in his elderly mother’s home in the same 
city. Jensen and I arrived in a taxi from the train station, and we were unsure exactly 
which house it was – that was until we saw Jens on the doorstep dressed in a traditional 
Islamic robe with a black vest and a long beard. When meeting an interviewee, the 
first level of trust often occurs in the first seconds, and new levels of trust can be built 
as the meeting and interview continue (Speckhard 2009: 211). This first meeting with 
Jens, on the one hand, exemplified the difference between us and Jens. He looked very 
Islamic and very unlike us. Still identifying as a devout Muslim and dressing as such, 
but now distancing himself from radical interpretations of the religion, his clothing 
and beard could have been a way for him to signal to us that this version of Islam that 
he now followed was the right version of Islam. But, on the other hand, the first 
meeting with Jens also showed the sameness among us, as Jens greeted us with a very 
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distinct accent from the area of Denmark he was from. He was, in a way, very different 
from us, but also, we were much alike. We had brought cake to the interview, but so 
had Jens. We started the conversation with jokes about the abundance of cake we 
needed to devour during the interview. This had the effect of building trust between 
us and him. From our perspective, it showed that we were not afraid of him, and he 
also showed that he was not afraid of us. We sat down at his mother’s dinner table in 
her living room. Jens seemed to relax more and more during the start of our 
conversation, and he did not seem to be affected by being interviewed by the two of 
us. He did, however, emphasize that we were only allowed to record the interview if 
he were anonymized. During the interview, he referred to and criticized a Danish TV 
station for an undercover documentary on fraud in Danish mosques. He might thus 
have felt a need to assure that we were not going to use the interview in any such way. 
Even though Jens had talked about his radicalization experience to a journalist and 
was a form of trained speaker, he was nonetheless a fragile interviewee. He had been 
in jail for planning a terrorist attack, and now suffered mental problems such as 
anxiety from experiences in his past. Bringing cake and showing a warm interest in 
him was a way for us to ease the tension in the interview. This seemed to work, as he 
was willing to share his story. A similar interviewee was Emelie, an ethnic Swedish 
female convert who was part of a radical Islamist milieu. She was also a fragile 
interviewee, but unlike the other formers, she had not told her story to anyone in a 
long time. The interview with her took place in a borrowed meeting room in a library 
in a large city in Denmark. I had brought cookies, and the library served coffee and 
tea. Emelie did seem nervous prior to the interview, but the coffee and tea seemed to 
help calm her down, and as the interview got started, she was open and willing to tell 
her story.  
The second interview was with Ali, an ethnic minority man who was part of a radical 
Islamist group where three travelled to Syria as foreign fighters. This interview was, 
like the interview with Jens, conducted by both Jensen and me for the same reasons 
as with Jens, but also because the contact to Ali was established through a former 
student of Jensen. We interviewed Ali in a public library in a large city in Denmark. 
We had arranged access to a private meeting room as Ali wanted a place where he 
could “talk freely.” We had brought cookies and the library served coffee, and the 
setting seemed to suit Ali. He was willing to talk about his radicalization experience. 
He was the most practiced speaker of all the formers. He had held several 
presentations about his experiences with radicalization and seemed used to talking 
about it with people with the similar positionalities as ours. As mentioned, he did 
question our usage of the concept of radicalization towards the end of the interview, 
but it did not affect the interview as such (as it did with the interviews with the 
professionals and other people related to the issue of radicalization; see Article 5). 
Other experienced speakers were Gittan, an ethnic Swedish female convert to Islam, 
who had been part of a radical Islamist milieu and married to a jihadist, and Svend, 
an ethnic Danish male convert who was part of a radical Islamist milieu. The interview 
with Gittan was conducted over a video message app, and the interview with Svend 
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was conducted via phone. I wanted to interview both of them face-to-face but was 
unable to travel to Sweden to meet with Gittan, and I became sick when I had the 
interview date with Svend in a large city in Denmark. We had not been able to find 
another date, so the compromise was a phone call, which he preferred over a video 
interview. As these interviews were not face-to-face, I was not able to influence the 
setting as with the other interviews. These interviews were initiated almost at the 
beginning of the conversation. I tried to make facial expressions in the video interview 
and sounds over the phone that would express my sincere interest and genuine care in 
order for them to trust me (see Speckhard 2009). This was difficult when not being 
face-to-face. However, Gittan and Svend both gave in-depth insights into their 
radicalization experiences. This could of course also have be the result of them being 
experienced speakers. They seemed to be able to switch on their “story telling mode” 
and they were willing to answer my questions. 
Common to most of the interviews with the formers was that they were trained 
speakers. But my interview technique itself also had the purpose of facilitating 
narratives about their life and what had led to their radicalization experiences.  
Narrative-inspired interview technique 
In her recommendations of taking narratives seriously, Susan E. Chase (1995) stressed 
that qualitative interviews should consist of questions that encourage the interviewee 
to give narrative accounts from their life history. Chase noted that this has the 
advantage that the interviewee takes a form of responsibility for the interview, but 
also that specific narratives strengthen the analysis between the particular and general 
social phenomena. Lois Presser and Sandberg (2015) have argued for a narrative 
approach to criminology (see also Sandberg 2018; Presser & Sandberg 2019). By 
asking questions in a way that facilitates narratives, we can obtain knowledge about 
the criminal’s own life and the milieu the criminal has been or is part of. I have been 
inspired by these narrative approaches in my interview technique. These approaches 
resonate with some methodological reflections from research on terrorism and 
radicalization. Juergensmeyer and M.K. Sheikh (2020: 5) argued that a challenge in 
research on radical Islamists is to “penetrate” into their worldviews. Their aim was to 
“enter religious minds,” and to do this, they adopted Weber’s notion of verstehen. 
This means understanding the thoughts and actions of radical Islamists from their own 
perspective. Their effort was to “take seriously the perspectives of the subjects in the 
social analysis of religious experiences” (Juergensmeyer & M.K. Sheikh 2020: 3). 
According to these researchers and their sociotheological approach, these religious 
experiences need to be located within their social context. Only in this way can we 
understand and take seriously “the social construction of the world as they perceive 
it” (Juergensmeyer & M.K. Sheikh 2020: 4; see also Dawson 2019).  
I was guided by these observations when devising my interview technique. My 
technique can best be described as semi-structured interviews with a focus on 
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facilitating narratives. My interview guide consisted of questions divided into themes 
that followed the analytical focus of the study. These questions therefore revolved 
around the role of religion in their radicalization process, their radicalization process 
as part of a subcultural formation, and the gendered aspects of radicalization. 
However, the first question of the interviews focused on getting the interviewee to tell 
their own radicalization story in their own words and as detailed as possible. They 
were all asked the same initial question:  I would like to hear your own story. Can you 
tell me about how you became a radical Islamist? The purpose of this question was 
to bring the interviewees’ own understanding of their experiences to the forefront of 
the interview. Or, in the words of Speckhard (2009: 206), to “let them talk freely.” In 
this way, the interviewees were able to talk about the aspects of their lives that they 
saw as relevant and as connected to their radicalization experience. The initial 
question animated the interviewees to talk. Some of them talked for over an hour 
without me asking follow-up questions. This technique to interviewing formers 
resembles what Juergensmeyer (2020: 61) called “informative conversations.” His 
approach to interviewing radical Islamists was one that was not directed at the outset. 
The first part of the interviews or conversations had an “autobiographical” character, 
and then follow-up questions about the areas he was interested in would often come 
naturally (Juergensmeyer 2020: 62; see also Nilsson 2018: 427). 
After the initial question, I steered the interview in the direction of the themes that I 
especially sought knowledge about but most often in connection to their own story 
about their radicalization experience. Sometimes, this simply involved  asking 
encouraging follow-up questions and asking the interviewees to elaborate on what 
they had already talked about in order for them to continue their stories (see Chase 
1995: 14; Sandberg 2018: 239). In the interviews with the converts, for example, I  
asked What did your family think about your conversion? and, if there were specific 
life crises, emotions, or frustrations connected to their conversions. Often, this had 
already come up, but it was a question that sparked reflections about identity and 
religion and was also a way to gain knowledge about the role of religion in their 
radicalization experience. Other times, I asked concrete questions from my interview 
guide on the themes I was interested in, both when they came as natural follow-up 
questions but also as a way to direct the interview towards my specific areas of 
interest. In relation to subculture as a theme, I asked questions about the style and 
symbols in the radical Islamist milieus they were part of and if this was something 
that had attracted them to these milieus. I also asked questions about the role of 
religion and, for example, if they saw themselves as especially righteous when they 
were part of the radical Islamist milieu, and how they then saw other Muslims and 
non-Muslims. In terms of gender, I, e.g., asked the female interviewees how it was to 
be a woman in a radical Islamist milieu (with strict gender roles) and if that was 
something that had attracted them to the milieu. In all instances, I encouraged them to 
tell me stories related to the questions from their time as radical Islamists. 
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But can we trust them? - And other ethical concerns 
A central question in research on terrorism and radicalization has been whether or not 
we can trust what former or current radical Islamists say. James Khalil (2019) 
criticized what he believes is a tendency among researchers on terrorism and 
radicalization to uncritically take interviewee responses at face value. According to 
Khalil, researchers should cross-check with open source material to determine if what 
terrorists say is actually the truth (see also Horgan 2012; Speckhard 2009). Dawson 
(2019) criticized this approach to terrorists’ accounts. He argued that, when the 
research aim is to gain knowledge about the terrorists’ worldviews, it is irrelevant 
whether or not their claims are “true” or “fantastical” because this is what they 
perceive as reality and thus what forms their thoughts and actions (Dawson 2019: 80). 
So, even though terrorists present a “carefully choreographed image of themselves,” 
we should treat this as data itself and as something that can provide knowledge about 
their identity and culture (Juergensmeyer 2020: 64). A central point must then be that 
we should not present our data as facts about the world but as the interviewees’ 
subjective understanding of the world (Nilsson 2018: 429). 
The aim of my interviews with the formers was to acquire knowledge about how they 
had understood the world when they were radical Islamists and what had preceded 
their entry into radical Islamist milieus and worldviews. I have no reason to believe 
that the formers tried to hide something from me or were deceitful in any other ways. 
I therefore did not see it as my task to double-check or verify their accounts of their 
radicalization experience. However, interviewing formers and asking them to produce 
narratives about their past, of course, involved a memory bias “as the interviewees 
talk about radical milieus they are no longer a part of, no longer agree with, and have 
an interest in distancing themselves from” (Article 4) in terms of social desirability. 
As noted in Article 4, “their retrospective accounts could, for example, thus be 
understood as a form of legitimisation of life choices that they now regret (cf. Sykes 
and Matza 1957)”. But, there is a risk of memory bias and distortion issues in all 
retrospective accounts of behavior and thoughts. I consequently believe that the 
formers’ accounts of their past should be extended the same credibility we would 
extend to other people in their retrospective accounts of their past (see Dawson 2019: 
82). 
Furthermore, using an interview technique designed to facilitate narratives required 
ethical considerations of the formers’ psychological well-being. As already described, 
the formers could, to a large extent, be characterized as fragile interviewees that had 
entered radical Islamist milieus and adhered to worldviews and acted in ways that they 
later regretted and had to live with. A main ethical concern for me was that the 
interviewees should not feel psychological discomfort or harm in telling their stories. 
I clearly stated before the interviews what my research aim was and what the interview 
was about (as I had also done in our correspondence prior to the interviews). There 
was thus an “oral informed consent” prior to the interview (see Speckhard 2009: 204; 
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Nilsson 2018: 426), and the interviewees were told that, if they did not want to answer 
any specific question or wanted to stop the interview, they could. I also assured them 
that the interviews would be anonymized and they were going to be assigned 
pseudonyms (knowing that some of the formers had told their story in other contexts 
and that some people might be able to connect their story to the stories told in other 
contexts). One way to deal with the fragile interviewees and sensitive character of the 
topic was to be empathic and show emotions when they told about what they perceived 
as injustices, discrimination, or other personal crises. An example of perceived 
injustice was the case of Ali, who told about his experience with being forced out of 
his high school because of false accusations of him being a radical Islamist, and his 
accounts of his mother’s death. Also, there was Jens’s account of his father’s 
psychopathic tendencies where he had locked Jens in a room with no lights, and his 
accounts of still being a victim of psychological and physical abuse from the radical 
Islamist milieu he had now left. And, Emelie, who towards the end of the interview, 
told about her family situation were her ex-husband, in her words, had tricked Emelie 
and taken their two daughters with him to a country in North Africa and that she had 
not been in contact with them for over three years. I believe that taking a neutral 
position towards the interviewees when they told about these sensitive and emotional 
accounts from their lives would have been perceived as cold-hearted and would have 
negatively affected the interviewees’ desire to deliver personal accounts from their 
lives (see also Speckhard 2009: 215). Therefore, I actively showed emotions and 
expressions of care. However, even though there were times during the interviews 
where the interviewees seemed uncomfortable with having to relive and tell about 
their past, three of the interviewees after the interview said that the interview actually 
had been a kind of therapeutic experience for them. Concerning his interviews with 
former jihadists, Nilsson (2018: 425-426) described how his interviewees saw the 
interview as an opportunity to reflect aloud on experiences and feelings that they had 
carried with them for a long while. The formers that I interviewed expressed a similar 
experience from being interviewed about their past. Thus, my experience that they 
invested a lot in our conversation and that they seemed interested in telling their story 
was perhaps the result of them “using” the interview to reflect on emotions and 
experiences that they have been carrying around with them since they left the radical 
Islamist milieus. I do, of course, not know exactly how the interviewees felt about the 
interview experience in the time after the interview. My experience during the 
sessions and what they told me after the interview about their experience of being 
interviewed, however, indicates that they were not psychologically harmed by the 
interview or my questions. 
An often discussed methodological and ethical issue regarding interviewing terrorists 
has been the moral concern about giving any credence to what terrorists have to say 
as it has been seen as ultimately being the same as excusing or sympathizing with their 
deviant views (for a critique of this criticism, see Horgan 2012; Dawson 2019). This 
issue can also be related to interviewing formers. The aim of the interviews with the 
formers was to understand what attracted them to radical Islamist worldviews and 
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milieus, and a special focus was the role of religion therein. Dawson (2019: 83) argued 
that the criticism of talking to terrorists is even more stark when we as researchers 
acknowledge the motivations of terrorists to be genuinely religious (in their own 
perception). This is in many ways what I did in the analysis of the interviews with the 
formers for Articles 3 and 4. It should be noted here that taking their religious 
motivations seriously is not the same as engaging in appeasement of their past 
behaviors or worldviews, nor do I wish to heroize their abandonment of the radical 
Islamist milieus and worldviews. The task has simply been to understand why and 
how they became radical Islamists. Here, it seems relevant to quote Dawson (2019: 
83), who said, “we need to differentiate between recognizing their religiosity and the 
legitimacy of their beliefs. Accepting the former need not entail, in this case, accepting 
the latter.” Thus, while I recognize and stress the importance of religiosity in the 
formers’ radicalization experiences, I do not legitimate their former religious beliefs. 
Instead, I argue that, in order to prevent others from adhering to radical Islamist 
worldviews, it is of essence that we take seriously the religiosity of radical Islamists 
as this is part of what makes radical Islamism attractive to young people in the West. 
As discussed above, one of the most prominent reasons for the formers to participate 
in the interviews was that they hoped to be able to contribute with knowledge that, in 
the end, might help the prevention of radicalization. Even though I explained that the 
purpose was primarily to publish academic literature about radicalization processes 
and not explicitly about the prevention of radicalization, I hoped that the interviewees’ 
accounts from their past could help in this regard. 
Coding the interviews 
The interview with the formers lasted 90 minutes on average. All the interviews were 
recorded digitally and transcribed in full by me, except for the interview with Svend, 
which was transcribed by a student assistant (I will get back to the interviews 
transcribed by student assistants below). The interviews were coded thematically (see 
Sandberg 2018: 243) using NVivo. This means that I first read the transcripts in their 
entirety to let the radicalization experiences of the formers be represented in their own 
terms. I then applied different categories or themes to their accounts. These were 
formed by the focus and theoretical approaches employed in the dissertation. The 
coding reflected the ambition of taking their narratives seriously while also having 
specific themes of interest. 
4.4. INTERVIEWS WITH PROFESSIONALS AND OTHER ACTORS 
RELATED TO THE ISSUE OF RADICALIZATION 
The interviews with the current and former professionals working within the 
prevention of radicalization and other actors related to the issue of Islamist 
radicalization have been discussed in Article 5 in relation to positionality and the 
importance of careful wording when doing research on a sensitive and political topic. 
Thus, I will not delve further into these interviews in regard to these issues. 
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The interviews with the professionals and other actors followed a similar interview 
guide as the interviews with the formers. These interviews were also inspired by the 
narrative interview technique as the aim was to have the interviewees tell as 
specifically as they could, and were allowed to, about concrete cases of radicalization 
processes that they knew of. The interview guide also consisted of the areas of focus 
as the interviews with the formers, that is, the role of religion, subcultural aspects and 
formation, and gendered aspects of radicalization. The main difference was that the 
professionals and other actors had to talk about people other than themselves. These 
were then akin to expert interviews, as discussed in Article 5. 
Transcription and coding of the interviews 
The interviews lasted 90 minutes on average. I transcribed some of the interviews but 
14 of the 18 interviews (19 including the interview with Svend) were transcribed by 
four student assistants. The assistants were all given the same written instruction on 
how to conduct the transcriptions. This was done to make the transcription as similar 
as possible. In cases where they could not hear or understand what was being said in 
the recorded interviews, the assistants were instructed to make a note in their 
transcription files stating the time code of the recordings. I then checked the 
recordings and added the sections of the transcriptions that they could not hear or 
understand. One of the assistants has a Muslim background. She was therefore 
assigned the interviews with the interviewees with Muslim backgrounds, such as 
representatives from mosques. In this way, she could help translate the Arabic words 
that the interviewees sometimes used, which I did not understand, and she could 
explain certain meanings of phrases. All student assistants were instructed to maintain 
complete secrecy about what the interviewees had said in the interviews. They were 
given USB sticks with the recording of the interviews and were instructed to only save 
their transcription file on these USB sticks, which were then handed back to me at the 
end of their transcription. 
I coded the interviews in two ways. First, I conducted the same thematic coding as I 
had done for the interviews with the formers. These themes were discussed and 
analyzed together with the interviews with the formers in Article 4. Second, as I read 
each of the interviews in its own terms, I noted several common methodological 
themes. These themes reflected the interviewee’s opinion about the concept of 
radicalization and interviewer/interviewee positionality in the interview interaction. 
These themes were then discussed in Article 5. 
4.5. USE OF ALTERNATIVE SOURCES AND METHODS 
As a way to battle the problem of gaining access to the hard-to-reach field of 
radicalization, this dissertation has explored alternative data sources as part of the 
empirical bricolage. Poul Duedahl and Michael H. Jacobsen (2012) argued for the use 
of what they called “discrete methods” (my translation). Discrete methods offer an 
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explorative approach where the researcher can draw freely on the accessible material 
that the researcher believes can help shed light on the research question (Duedahl & 
Jacobsen 2012: 174). Duedahl and Jacobsen (2012: 183) also mentioned that 
researchers in social science have often seen discrete methods as a necessary evil 
before employing more conventional methods. However, I argue that, in the field of 
radicalization research, alternative methods and data sources are often necessary but 
never evil, when we take into account the hard-to-reach character of the research 
subjects. The following will describe the use of biographical and journalistic sources 
and virtual ethnographic-inspired internet research as examples of relevant alternative 
data sources and methods. 
4.5.1. BIOGRAPHICAL AND JOURNALISTIC SOURCES 
Yvonne Mørck (1995: 123) emphasized that empirical bricolages involve being aware 
of the many different phenomena that can be used as empirical material. Some 
empirical materials can be more primary or comprehensive than others, but they all 
play a part in painting the whole empirical picture of the research. As part of its 
empirical bricolage, this dissertation has drawn on different biographical texts on 
known radical Islamists and journalistic sources that include knowledge about cases 
of Islamist radicalization processes. This method resembles what has been termed the 
“historical method” (see Duedahl & Jacobsen 2012: 183) or “document analysis” (see 
Duedahl & Jacobsen 2010). Document analysis has often been used by historians to 
gain insight into historical contexts, but in a broader sense, documents can be defined 
as any reference to items that carry information (Duedahl & Jacobsen 2010). The 
different texts on known radical Islamists that this dissertation has drawn on can thus 
be described as documents in the sense that they carry information about the 
radicalization processes of young people from the West. Some of these books have 
been used explicitly in some of the articles of this dissertation (J. Sheikh 2015; 
Seierstad 2016; Albæk, Dalsgaard & Rée 2019), while others have been used as 
background material to gain knowledge about processes of radicalization (Soei 2018; 
Khaja 2017). Jakob Sheikh is a Danish journalist with a Muslim background who 
managed to gain the trust of several Danish radical Islamists many of whom became 
foreign fighters. His book is a portrait of their radicalization processes. Åsne Seierstad 
is a Norwegian journalist and writer. Her book is about the radicalization process of 
two sisters with a Somali background living in Norway who joined ISIS and their 
radicalization process. Mette M. Albæk, Louise Dalsgaard, and Natascha R. 
Mikkelsen are Danish journalists who have written a book about the life and 
radicalization of the Danish citizen Omar el-Hussein with a Palestinian background, 
who committed a terror attack in 2015 (see also Soei 2018; Khaja 2017). These books 
have provided valuable insights about radicalization processes of young people living 
in Scandinavia. They have thus been “documents” that have carried information. 
Furthermore, source criticism is an inherent part of doing document analysis. The 
main task is to be able to critically assess the text in order to be able to sort and 
evaluate the statements in the text that are of relevance to the research question 
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(Duedahl & Jacobsen 2012: 186). The biographical and journalistic sources used in 
this dissertation have all thoroughly described how they collected their data and whom 
they talked to. Even when applying a hermeneutics of suspicion, they seemed like 
valid sources. Journalists, such as the authors of the material used in this dissertation, 
are often some of the few people who have contacts in hard-to-reach groups such as 
radical Islamists. Using materials from journalists who are known to have 
relationships of trust with radical Islamists can provide insights that researchers might 
never be able to gain by themselves. The biographical and journalistic sources have 
been valuable for this dissertation, even though when compared with the interviews 
and the virtual ethnographic-inspired internet research, they have been a less 
comprehensive or secondary data source. 
4.5.2. VIRTUAL ETHNOGRAPHY-INSPIRED INTERNET RESEARCH 
Another important part of the empirical bricolage has been virtual ethnography-
inspired internet research. The focus on terrorist organizations’ online propaganda has 
been a central part of the research field in recent years, not least since the emergence 
of ISIS, which has become known for being especially professional in their 
propaganda. In fact, some researchers have argued that ISIS has sought to establish a 
“virtual caliphate” where social media platforms have become key elements in 
disseminating ISIS propaganda and recruiting new members (see, e.g., Bloom & 
Daymon 2018; Winter 2015; Awan 2017). Such analysis of the propaganda of terrorist 
organizations has often been instrumental in character and focused on how their 
propaganda has a specific aim of recruiting new members. My approach was different. 
Instead of focusing on terrorist organizations’ instrumental propaganda, I focused on 
the cultural creativity and stylistic repertoire of the broader environments supportive 
of jihadism. In other words, this dissertation has sought to understand and theorize 
jihadi subculture through subcultural artifacts, symbols, and style on the internet. 
Thus, instead of understanding the internet as an instrumental tool for recruitment, the 
present dissertation understands the internet as a place where culture is formed and 
reformed (see Hine 2000: 9). 
My approach has been inspired by what Christine Hine (2000) has called virtual 
ethnography. Whereas ethnography is about understanding a group of people’s 
culture, interactions, thoughts, and perceptions of the world, the aim of virtual 
ethnography is the same, except that it specifically explores groups, culture, and 
interaction on the internet (Hine 2000; Larsen 2012: 238). Hine (2000) defined virtual 
ethnography as a way to join an internet site for a longer period of time, and interact 
with the people who use the site and thereby establish a detailed understanding of how 
the site is used to create and maintain relationships (Larsen & Glud 2013: 69). I have 
not interacted with users, and in this regard, my approach differs from virtual 
ethnography. However, my approach is inspired by virtual ethnography’s focus on 
understanding culture. Malene C. Larsen and Louise N. Glud (2013: 73) have noted 
that the use of new media can give access to otherwise hidden cultures. Paraphrasing 
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this, we can say that new media can give access to and knowledge about otherwise 
hard-to-reach groups, such as those in broader jihadi subculture. Sites that consist of 
user-generated content, such as YouTube, present an opportunity to be creative and 
experiment in our approach to qualitative studies (Larsen & Glud 2013: 69). 
Furthermore, they present a way to gain knowledge of and insight into the culture of 
those who share content on these sites. The analysis of jihadi rap and the theorization 
on the attraction of radical Islamism discussed in Articles 1 and 2 should thus be seen 
as being generated through a creative approach to qualitative studies and as a way to 
gain insight in to the “hidden” or hard-to-reach broader jihadi subculture. 
On finding jihadi rap online 
According to Larsen (2012: 236), internet researchers piece together their research 
project with the data sources they find relevant in relation to their research question. 
The choices internet researchers make are often based on arbitrary decisions, which 
come to shape the boundaries of the research project (Hine 2000: 62). According to 
Hine (2000), virtual ethnography often resembles what she called connective 
ethnography. Instead of fixating on one site, researchers should focus on the flow 
among sites and their content. Within connective ethnography, the researcher 
typically employs a form of snowballing where one finding in the field can lead to 
new findings. In other words, this is an approach where we as researchers have to be 
open towards the changeability and fluid character of the field. We cannot decide in 
advance which empirical sources are useful or which sites or media are useful. The 
design of our study, as a result, is something that develops as we conduct the research 
(Larsen & Glud 2013: 71). 
The online methodological approach employed in this dissertation is inspired by the 
virtual ethnographic or connective ethnographic approach to internet research. As 
stated in Article 1, “this methodology is appropriate for the study of jihadi rap because 
jihadi rap is a diffuse and fluid phenomenon, which is hard to circumscribe or fix as a 
traditional research subject that can be identified in well-defined spaces” (Article 1: 
426). The following will describe how the different jihadi rap songs and videos 
employed and analyzed in Articles 1 and 2 were found. 
The starting point of the internet research was a Google search on words and phrases 
such as “hip-hop and Islam.” The internet research that ended up being about jihadi 
rap started more broadly and focused on how Islam had been employed in hip-hop in 
general. Researching the connection between hip-hop and Islam, however, led to 
journalistic sites and blogs about jihadi rap. This entailed a more detailed focus of the 
internet research on jihadist elements in the newer subgenres of hip-hop. The search 
on hip-hop and Islam ultimately led to searches on “jihadi hip-hop” and “jihadi rap.” 
This resembled what Hine (2000: 62) described as the often arbitrary decisions that 
come to shape the boundaries of one’s research project when doing internet research, 
and that we cannot in advance decide which empirical sources are useful to us. The 
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jihadi rap songs mentioned on the journalistic sites and blogs were the starting points. 
Following the links to the songs led to the video-sharing site, YouTube, and other 
streaming media where I was able to locate other songs. This was, in part, a result of 
the nature of the internet and social media. Algorithms on sites such as YouTube 
ensure that similar videos as the one you are watching will be available to you. This 
is also an example of the snowballing effect where watching one video will lead to 
another video. 
The first music video that I found, which was mentioned on one of the blogs, was 
Sheikh Terra and the Soul Salah Crew’s song “Dirty Kuffar,” which is one of the most 
well-known jihadi rap songs. Searching for “jihadi rap” also produced several links to 
the song on YouTube. This song was used in the analysis of Articles 1 and 2. The 
other song by Sheikh Terra and the Soul Salah Crew, which was discussed in Article 
2, is the introductory song to the documentary entitled “Malcolm X: The Prince of 
Islam.” This song, and the accompanying documentary, were found through searches 
for Sheikh Terra and the Soul Salah Crew. This led to a discussion forum on a far 
right-wing site called Stormfront.5 In a forum thread from 2007, the user “12monk” 
provided links to Sheikh Terra and the Soul Salah Crew. Some of the links were not 
working any longer, but eventually I found a working link to the documentary.6 This 
was another example of how the design of one’s internet research is developed as the 
research is conducted and of the fluid and changeable character of the field. The 
internet research on jihadi rap was characterized by a trial and error process of finding 
the relevant empirical material (songs and videos) and the working links as the songs 
are continually deleted from the various websites and social media because of the 
explicit jihadist content. 
Another of the more well-known artists included in Articles 1 and 2 is Deso Dogg. 
When searching for ‘jihadi rap’, Deso Dogg is one of the first names that appears on 
the list. I found several journalistic sources that had written about him and his music 
and his journey to becoming a member of ISIS.7 As a prominent ISIS member 
involved in their propaganda production and an example of the often discussed 
convergence between street culture and jihadist milieus, Deso Dogg was of interest in 
my search to understand the broader jihadi subculture. I immersed myself in the 
descriptions and knowledge about his life. Doing a search on YouTube for his name 
provided several rap songs from his time as a rapper in Germany. When listening to 
these gangsta rap-style songs, YouTube also provided links to anashid that he had 
performed while being a member of ISIS. One of the anashid was “Wacht doch auf!,” 
which is included in the analysis in Article 1. This nashid was used in a sample on the 
                                                          
5 https://www.stormfront.org/forum/t417762/ link visited March 2, 2020. 
6 https://archive.org/details/Malcom_X_Prince_of_Islam link visited March 2, 2020. 
7 E.g., http://www.thefader.com/2016/08/02/isis-denis-cuspert-deso-dogg-rapper link visited 
March 2, 2020. 
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album “Straight Outta Syria.” From this album, the songs 
“#fuckwithmeyouknowimhelal” and ‘”Pepsi, Basmati und Kuffr” are included in 
Articles 1 and 2. I found the album while doing an in-depth search on the music by 
Deso Dogg. After visiting several sites with links to other sites, I eventually ended up 
visiting a hip-hop discussion forum, where the user “Didier” in a post from around 
2015 provided a link to the album.8 I ultimately found the album on the music 
streaming website Audiomack.9 
A third jihadi rap group that is included in Articles 1 and 2 is The Mujahideen Team. 
Their album “Clash of Civilizations” containing the songs “Blue Nile,” “Gun Fire 
Sound,” and “Day of Retribution” was mentioned on one of the journalistic sites and 
blogs, and I found the album on a music streaming service. 
The above songs are all discussed in Articles 1 and 2. I have, however, seen videos 
and listened to several other jihadi rap songs available on the internet. The criteria for 
choosing which songs to include in the analysis in the articles were that they had either 
an explicitly jihadist message or that they in other ways provided valuable insight into 
the broader jihadi subculture. This was the case with the song “Blue Nile’” which is 
not jihadist as such but provides insight into views on gender and masculinity. Several 
songs were left out of the analysis. This was determined by the limit of how many 
songs could be included within the scope of the articles and because the songs 
included in the analysis had to be seen as songs illustrative of the genre of jihadi rap. 
The included songs also have a substantial number of listeners (for instance, the song 
“Dirty Kuffar” had over 100,000 views on YouTube at the time of writing). 
The aim of the virtual ethnographic-inspired internet research was to gain insight into 
the symbolic and stylistic cultural repertoire of jihadi subculture and to provide a basis 
for a theorization of its attraction. I have a recording of all the songs and took several 
screenshots to document the style and artistic messages of the songs and visual 
expression of style. Screenshots are normal practice when conducting virtual 
ethnography and should be seen as a form of digital field notes (see Larsen 2012). In 
the case of content containing jihadist messages, there was even more reason to 
thoroughly document the material as it is continually deleted from various websites. 
I did not conduct a formal coding of the material as the empirical material was visual 
and in the form of lyrics in songs. However, I viewed the videos and listened to the 
lyrics first and then analyzed the material through the lens of subcultural theory and 
concepts such as bricolage, style, and resistance. In this way, I attempted to strike a 
                                                          
8 http://www.kanyetothe.com/forum/index.php?topic=2876433.0 link visited March 2, 2020. 
9 https://audiomack.com/album/trapspotsyria/straight-outta-syria link visited March 2, 2020. 
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balance between a theoretical reading and an empirical openness as suggested in 
virtual ethnographic research.
 
73 
CHAPTER 5. MAIN FINDINGS 
This chapter will present the main findings of the research articles. As discussed in 
chapter 1, a criticism within the academic discussion of radicalization has rightly been 
that the travelling of the concept of radicalization from policy-making to academia 
has caused an ethnification, individualization, and psychologization of the process of 
radicalization. In other words, radicalization has been understood as driven by 
individual push factors or deficits. Some researchers have, however, answered this 
criticism by emphasizing the importance of structural factors, such as economic and 
social marginalization, in radicalization processes. This has often led to structural 
perspectives that end up arguing that radicalization is driven by structural push 
factors. This dissertation offers a third space in radicalization research as it focusses 
on and theorizes the attraction of radical Islamism. Therefore, the focus is on pull 
factors. However, as the findings of the research articles showed, we have to take into 
account micro-, meso-, and macrolevel explanations, in order to understand the pull 
factors. The aim of the dissertation, which the articles all deliver a part of the answer 
to, has been to understand and theorize the attraction of radical Islamism given 
specific social and societal circumstances. The overall research question was: How 
can we theorize the attraction of radical Islamism in the West? This dissertation has 
analytically understood and discussed radicalization in the specific light of processes 
of subcultural formation and processes of development of religious emotions. The 
following will present and discuss the main findings of the articles focusing on 
radicalization as subcultural formation and then the articles focusing on radicalization 
as development of religious emotions. 
5.1. RADICALIZATION AS SUBCULTURAL FORMATION: MAIN 
FINDINGS10 
Through a subcultural perspective and the empirical material of jihadi rap, Articles 1 
and 2 contribute to the understanding and theorization of what can be attractive in 
adhering to such a worldview. 
The aim of Article 1 is twofold: 1) to discuss the relevance of a subcultural approach 
to the study of jihadism and 2) to illustrate the relevance of this approach through an 
analysis of jihadi rap. To explore this aim, the article employs a CCCS-inspired 
approach to subcultures. However, following Jensen (2018a), the article argues that a 
rethinking and renewal of subcultural theory may be achieved through a dialogue with 
intersectionality. Pertaining to the first part of the twofold aim of the article, the article  
argues that the relevance of a subcultural approach to the study of jihadism can be 
found in viewing jihadism as a subculture that provides an “answer” to problems 
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pertaining to participants’ shared social position. The article argues that jihadi 
subculture offers a cultural answer situated in a socially complex way, offering a 
viable identity for the participants. By viewing jihadism as a subculture, we are thus 
aided in understanding and theorizing why becoming a participant in such a subculture 
can be attractive. 
To further illustrate the relevance of a subcultural approach to jihadism, Article 1 
analyzes one of the hybrid forms of cultural expression central to jihadi subculture, 
namely jihadi rap music. The article finds that jihadi rap is a way to express resistance 
through a creative cultural bricolage of different and often contradictory cultural 
styles, and that jihadi rap can be interpreted as the explicit manifestation of a broader 
collective, oppositional, and subcultural answer to a shared situation of experienced 
othering. The argument is that an analysis of subcultural styles, such as jihadi rap, is 
important in its own right as it contributes to the study of the broader cultural and 
social ecology of a jihadi subculture. Jihadi rap can thus be understood as part of what 
makes jihad attractive among some young Muslims in the West, contributing to 
research on jihadi cool (Sageman 2008) and to the theorization of the attraction of 
radical Islamism in the West. 
The convergence between street culture and jihadi culture is further explored in 
Article 2. The purpose of Article 2 is to explain what makes jihadi subculture cool or 
attractive by analyzing the historical relationship between hip-hop and Islam through 
the same subcultural perspective as applied in Article 1, which allows a grasp of the 
aesthetic fascination of jihadism. The article traces the employment of Islam in hip-
hop to recent developments of jihadi rap. Within jihadi rap, we observe a form of 
bricolage that mixes and combines hip-hop musical style, the symbolism of US Black 
Islam, and jihadism, and the article argues that this type of stylistic appropriation of 
hip-hop coolness is part of what makes jihadi rap – and, in a broader sense, jihadi 
subculture – aesthetically and stylistically cool and therefore attractive. 
5.2. RADICALIZATION AS DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS 
EMOTIONS: MAIN FINDINGS11 
Articles 3 and Article 4 focus on the role of religion in Islamist radicalization 
processes. In these articles, it is argued that the role of religion is often downplayed 
in the research on radicalization. Article 3 suggests a theorization of how we can 
reinstate religion in the analysis, and Article 4 utilizes this theorization in the analysis 
of the interviews with formers and other actors linked to the issue of radicalization. 
Article 3 explores how we can reinstate religion in the analysis of Islamist 
radicalization in the West by introducing and developing the sociology of religious 
emotion (Riis & Woodhead 2010). The application of the sociology of religious 
                                                          
11 The following resembles formulations and arguments from Articles 3 and 4. 
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emotion enables a synthesis of opposing explanations of radicalization as it offers a 
way to understand how social and political contexts can be connected to religiosity. 
The article argues that retheorizing the understanding of underprivileged ethno-class 
experiences as a root cause of radicalization through Riis and Woodhead’s perspective 
enables an understanding of how such experiences are able to be transformed into 
religious emotions. What might have been personal feelings of anger towards society 
can be transformed into strong religious emotions in radical Islamist groups, which in 
some cases can initiate and amplify religiously based motivations to endorse or 
commit violence. The article furthermore argues that this meaningfulness of emotions 
can be experienced as a form of empowerment through an understanding of being part 
of a group of a “chosen few” and that underprivileged ethno-class experiences can be 
interpreted as a form of test from God resulting in emotional experiences of 
empowerment. The article consequently helps theorize and render intelligible why 
adhering to radical interpretations of Islam can be attractive to some young Muslims. 
Article 4 investigates the connection between certain context-specific experiences and 
specific interpretations of Islam that can initiate and amplify radicalization by drawing 
on the interview material and analyzing the five in-depth interviews with formers. The 
article seeks to answer two questions: Why did they become religious? and What 
characterized the processes of radicalization in the radical Islamist groups they 
became part of? 
The analysis finds that the formers differed in reasons for becoming religious partly 
due to four of them being converts to Islam. However, common to most of them was 
that becoming religious was linked to personal family background and life situations. 
They felt emotions such as confusion, anger, and loneliness because of doubt about 
existential questions, lack of sense of belonging, experiences of troublesome family 
backgrounds, and discrimination – in other words, they were cognitively open 
(Wiktorowicz 2005) to new understandings of themselves and society. Religion in 
different ways provided them with answers to these emotions. 
An analytical finding explained in Article 4 is that a cognitive opening is not 
necessarily limited to a rather short period after experiencing a form of crisis. 
Common to all the formers was that their state of cognitive openness was still present 
when they entered the radical groups and when they were part of them. In other words, 
religious emotional regimes within radical Islamist groups amplified and initiated the 
formers’ radicalization. They felt they were a better version of themselves and that 
they were better than all others. The article finds that there are social causes for 
seeking religion, but also that religiosity affects the social – the religious emotions 
within the groups create a tight-knit community of adherents who understand 
themselves as (the only true) righteous believers. Article 4 concludes that the 
radicalization process of the formers was characterized by this interplay. 
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5.3. LINKING THE FINDINGS BETWEEN RADICALIZATION AS 
SUBCULTURAL FORMATION AND RADICALIZATION AS 
DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS EMOTIONS: FOCUS ON 
ATTRACTION 
Even though the focuses on radicalization as subcultural formation and radicalization 
as development of religious emotions are treated separately in the articles, there are 
important links between the findings. In this respect, the dissertation argues that in 
order to understand the attraction of radical Islamism, it is fruitful to include the 
broader supportive milieu and not just the perpetrators of actual violence. This is 
linked to the question of how we can theorize the attraction of radical Islamism in the 
West. The articles show that theorizing the attraction through a subcultural 
perspective allows us to understand how broader jihadi subculture can provide an 
answer to shared situations related to the social position and experiences of the 
participants in the subculture and how jihadi subculture holds an aesthetic appeal. 
From the outside, the attraction of radical Islamism in the West can seem 
incomprehensible, but theorizing the attraction through a subcultural perspective 
enables an understanding of how radical Islamism can be considered attractive from 
within. Furthermore, the articles show that we can theorize the attraction through the 
perspective of the sociology of religious emotions. This perspective provides an 
understanding of how part of the subcultural answer can also be religious answers or 
reactions to problems related to specific social positions and experiences, and it allows 
an understanding of the empowering effects of strong religious emotions and how 
these can be connected to radicalization. Furthermore, it offers a theorization of (and 
a way to take seriously) the role of religion in Islamist radicalization processes, which 
has often been downplayed in the research field. 
Combined, the four articles illustrate that jihadi subculture can provide an answer to 
social marginalization or othering, but also to more existential questions, lack of a 
sense of belonging and experiences of troublesome family backgrounds. The 
attraction of radical Islamism can thus be on different levels, but they are all related 
to subcultural answers provided in jihadi subculture and its aesthetic appeal. The 
articles all help to answer the research question of how we can theorize the attraction 
of radical Islamism in the West. They do so by situating the attraction as a third space 
between explanations of radicalization that either focus on microlevel explanations or 
macrolevel explanations. The argument that can be derived across all articles is that, 
in order to understand the attraction of radical Islamism in the West, we need to take 
into account the social and societal context. Based on the empirical material, the 
articles and the dissertation as a whole offer a theorization on the attraction of radical 
Islamism that synthetizes different theoretical understandings and explanations of 
radicalization. The formation of religious emotions takes place in a subcultural milieu. 
This is part of the context in which individuals form their religiosity. Based on the 
empirical material, this dissertation offers a theorization of how the process of 
formation of strong religious emotions can and should be understood as a collective 
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process occurring in the context of a jihadi subcultural milieu. In this way, this 
dissertation’s focus on attraction calls for more research that combines micro-, meso-
, and macrolevel understandings of radicalization.  
The dissertation, as a whole, therefore contributes to the understanding and 
theorization of the pull-factors associated to Islamist radicalization processes in the 
West.
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